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When the Far Right Makes the News: Protest Characteristics and Media Coverage Of Far-Right Mobilization in Europe

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Abstract

When do the media cover far-right protests? News coverage matters for the entrenchment of the far right in contemporary democracies, but little comparative research has looked at what drives news attention to far-right mobilization. We apply a classic input-output process model of news selection bias to test the hypothesis that the visibility of far-right protests events depends on the characteristics of protest initiators, type of action, and reactions. We appraise this via logistic regressions on an original dataset of 5,972 protest events retrieved from online press releases by far-right groups (input) and national quality newspapers (output) in eleven European countries (2008-2018). The analysis confirms that news media are particularly responsive to contentious action, protest around migration issues, and action-reaction chains between political opponents. Our findings shed light on the role of news organizations in the success of the far-right and on the pathways by which these movements shape public agendas.

Keywords

Social Movements, Far Right, Protest, Mass Media, News Coverage, Europe

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Introduction

In recent years, protest mobilization has become a more integral part of far-right politics across Europe (Mudde, 2016, p. 13), including street marches by groups like PEGIDA in Germany, contentious actions by grassroots movements such as the French Génération Identitaire, and political violence by extremist movement-parties like the Greek Golden Dawn.[3] Albeit these bottom-up events still draw relatively few participants into the streets, their coverage in the mass media experienced a sharp increase over the past decade. But when do quality media report on far-right protest mobilization? If we know that media attention is central to the social standing of progressive protests and that coverage depends or the specific attributes of protest events (e.g. Wouters, 2015), we still lack a comprehensive understanding of what stimulates media attention to collective action on the far right.[4] In response, this article builds upon extant research on social movements and the far-right to study the drivers of media coverage of far-right protest mobilization in European countries.

We believe that examining how far-right protesters access the media is urgent, not least because it raises specific questions about the role of news organizations in expanding these movements' appeal (Mondon & Winter, 2020). Despite the persistent concern with the link between the media and the rise of far-right parties and leaders (de Jonge, 2019; Ellinas, 2018), there are few comparative efforts to systematically gauge far-right grassroots mobilization and its media coverage. In our view, this constitutes a major limit to the understanding of contemporary far-right politics. On the one hand, it

[3] Extant scholarship recognizes that far-right action in the streets is on the rise and no longer constitutes a marginal phenomenon in Europe, at least in terms of the number of demonstrations and their diffusion (Castelli Gattinara et al., 2022; Mudde 2016). Based on available PolDem data, Figure A1 in Appendix confirms that the relative weight of right-wing protest mobilization has grown compared to non-far-right protests over the period 2000-2015 (Kriesi et al., 2020).

[4] The paper uses the notion of far-right collective actors, encompassing both 'radical' and 'extreme' right nativist groups. While these diverge in terms of their 'hostile' or 'oppositional' stance towards democratic principles, the use of this umbrella term is meant to highlight: "a new phase in nativist politics in which the (populist) radical right and the extreme right are increasingly converging in different arenas and sharing common repertoires of action" (Pirro, 2022, pp. 9–10).

reiterates the established view that protest action is chiefly a preserve of progressive social movements, which recent studies are increasingly challenging (Minkenberg, 2019; Nissen, 2022). On the other, it neglects that protest visibility is a crucial factor for how social movements bring about change (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Mattoni & Treré, 2014). In contemporary 'audience democracies'(Kriesi, 2004), where most people learn about politics through the media, coverage sets the conditions for promoting movement agendas, influencing public opinion, and shaping the general understanding of a movement and its goals (Vliegenthart & Walgrave, 2012) – including on the far right. We thus believe that it is time to develop cross-national, longitudinal accounts of the determinants of media coverage of far-right protest mobilization across Europe.

With the present article, we seek to contribute to this scholarly debate. Theoretically, we combine scholarship on social movements and the far right to develop hypotheses on the determinants of media coverage of far-right protest mobilization. We build on a classic input-output process model of the possible selection bias in media coverage of protests (McCarthy et al., 1996), positing that protest characteristics work as input signals for subsequent media coverage (output), notably: (1) the organizational characteristics of the groups promoting protests; (2) the characteristics of protest events; and (3) the counter-protests by political opponents. Empirically, we present novel data from the Far-Right Protest in Europe (FARPE) project, a unique dataset which covers several thousand protest events by selected far-right collective actors in 11 European Union (EU) countries (2008–2018). We predict media coverage statistically, by means of logistic regressions testing the conditions under which the protest events promoted by far-right groups via press releases on their websites (which we consider as input signals) are met with subsequent coverage in newspaper articles from the quality press (output).

We find that classic input-output approaches to protest visibility in the news can be applied to far-right collective action. The results show that quality media react differently depending on the characteristics of far-right protest events. Specifically, we find that the coverage of far-right

mobilization in the mass media is driven by the reputation acquired by protest initiators on specific issues, notably immigration. Furthermore, we confirm that the media attach a particular news value to large-scale events, contentious tactics of mobilization and protests that generate controversy and drama via street counter-protests by political opponents. By shedding light on the media treatment of far-right protest mobilization, our results point at the interplay between collective action strategies, media logics and the 'mainstreaming' of the far right in contemporary democracies. More broadly, our systematic, cross-national account of the conditions under which news coverage of far-right collective action occurs bridges the exiting gap between research on far-right politics and the other subfields of political sociology.

We begin by introducing the theoretical framework of the study rooted in extant research on (progressive) movements and far-right parties. The following sections present the design and dataset used to test the hypotheses, and the results of the empirical analysis, before moving to the conclusions and discussing the main implications of this study for future research.

Getting into the news: mass media and social movements

Explanations formulated by social movement scholars for media coverage of protests have not been tested on far-right collective actors, despite evidence of their consolidation in the electoral arena, and of a surge in their protest activities across European countries (Castelli Gattinara, 2020). This 'division of labour' (Rydgren, 2007) between scholars of social movements and comparative politics of the far right is thus at odds with the growing research on the linkages between media-covered protests and elections (Hutter & Vliegenthart, 2016; McAdam & Tarrow, 2010; Heinze & Weisskircher, 2022). In our view, this obfuscates a full comprehension of the role of political communication processes in the success of the far right (Ellinas, 2018).

To date, scholars of comparative politics have mainly looked at the coverage of far-right parties or the characteristics and communication style of their leaders (Bos et al., 2010; Campus, 2010; de

Jonge, 2019), whereas they largely overlooked non-electoral dynamics and the impact of grassroots protest. Conversely, scholars of social movements have mostly dealt with the progressive side of politics (Gitlin, 1980; Lipsky, 1968), neglecting nativist and right-wing forms of contention (but see: Hellmeier & Vüllers, 2022; Volk, 2022; Volk & Weisskircher, 2023). At present, therefore, no study has offered a systematic assessment of how existing explanations of *media attention* to protest action apply to *far-right protest mobilization*. By *media attention* we refer to the coverage of political actors in the news (Wolfsfeld, 2011). Coverage constitutes a necessary precondition to achieve other important political outcomes such as media framing and priming, namely the processes by which actors define and transfer their messages (Iyengar & Kinder, 2010).[5] By *far-right protest mobilization* we indicate the set of demonstrative, confrontational, or violent protests in which nativist groups partake (Castelli Gattinara et al., 2022). This comprises all extra-parliamentary activities promoted by far-right 'collective actors', including far-right movement organizations and political parties in the streets.

Combining social movement theory and research on the far-right offers an innovative understanding of the conditions under which media attention to far-right protest mobilization occurs. These two strands of research similarly suggest that certain characteristics of protest mobilization are particularly likely to trigger the interest of news organizations, in other words they make protest action *newsworthy* (e.g. Harcup & O'Neill, 2001).[6] Social movement scholars suggest that the media tend to privilege actors with an institutional powerbase over outsider groups (Rohlinger, 2014), but that protest groups might get attention when collective action is unexpected or unambiguous, or the strategic profile of promoters resonates with social norms (Andrews & Caren, 2010; Elliott et al., 2016). In a similar fashion, research on far-right parties shows that the media have been willing to

[5] While we acknowledge that extensive coverage does not equate positive or substantial coverage, in this paper we do not address the issue of the quality of news reporting (see e.g. Bos et al., 2010).

[6] Beyond these meso-level factors, several macro-level factors also influence the media treatment of social movements and the far right (see: Amenta et al., 2017; Ellinas, 2018).

grant coverage to far-right leaders playing the role of outsiders, such as Georg Haider in Austria or more recently Marine Le Pen, because of their reputation and penchant to make bombastic or controversial statements that match the need for 'infotainment' in commercial news outlets (Ellinas, 2018; Mazzoleni, 2008). The attention that the mass media usually devote to far-right political parties would thus be linked to the capacity of these actors to reach wider audiences via their leadership characteristics as well as personalized and dramatized appeals.

While developed separately, these two strands of scholarship come to similar conclusions, in that they identify specific meso-level factors (the characteristics of protest events and far-right actors, respectively), that make grassroots mobilization newsworthy for news organizations. Following the growing strand of literature that has tried to bridge the study of social movements and that of the contemporary far right (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006), we believe that the cross-fertilization between these separate subfields of studies can be exploited to assess the determinants of media coverage of far-right protest mobilization.

The determinants of media attention to far-right protest mobilization

To explore when and why far-right protest mobilization receives coverage, we build on a classic input-output process model of possible selection bias in media coverage of movements (McCarthy et al. 1996), which we adapt to the case of far-right protest. This model of media selectivity links attention (*output*) to protest characteristics (*input).* While we acknowledge that journalists' behavior is in part determined by the political and media environment where they operate (Hallin & Mancini, 2012), we focus on meso-level factors and expect that the media react differently to protest events, depending on the newsworthiness of protest input characteristics. The fundamental hypothesis is that the likelihood of an event making the news depends on whether it meets one (or more) of these characteristics. Specifically, we focus on three types of input signals that have been previously linked

to news reporting: (1) the characteristics of the groups promoting protests; (2) those of the events they organize; and (3) the counter-protests that these may trigger.

First, the news value of far-right protests depends on the characteristics of the collective actors promoting mobilization, their engagement in formal or informal politics, and their (perceived or actual) status. This may be even more relevant for the far right than it is for the left, since the political right follows a distinct logic with respect to the relationship between electoral and protest mobilization, with rightist collective actors turning to one arena or the other, but usually not to both simultaneously (Hutter, 2014b). In terms of coverage, extant literature indicates that newsrooms are organized substantially around formal politics, which explains the different visibility of formal vs informal organizations in the media (Vliegenthart & Walgrave, 2012). Indeed, political actors that are mostly geared towards elections, or with a strong institutional power base (Ellinas, 2020) – such as those represented in parliament or participating in government – simply cannot be ignored by journalists (Tresh, 2009). Groups resting on more informal organizational structures and that are mostly oriented towards street-level engagement, such as social movements and parties lacking an institutional power base, must instead struggle harder to convince journalists that their actions, and demands, are worthy of news coverage (Amenta et al., 2017; Mattoni et al., 2020), even though this tendency may be changing with the rise of social media (Caren et al., 2020). Accordingly, we expect that:

> H1a: *media coverage is more likely for protest events initiated by far-right political parties rather than social movement organizations and street groups.*
>
> H1b: *media coverage is more likely for protest events initiated by far-right actors that are represented in national and supranational institutions.*

Second, the newsworthiness of far-right protests depends on the characteristics of protest events themselves, notably in terms of the scale of action, issue focus and protest tactics.[7] To begin with, the logic of numbers focuses on the turnout of demonstrations (Tilly, 2004): mass protests attracting larger crowds have higher chances to be considered relevant by journalists, thus getting newspaper coverage (McCarthy et al., 1996; Oliver & Meyer, 1999; Wouters, 2013; Wouters & Van Camp, 2017). In this respect, national-level protest events taking place in State capitals are harder for journalists to ignore, as they often also attract people from elsewhere (Biggs, 2018; Oliver & Maney, 2000), whereas the occasional local gatherings in small provincial towns that characterized far-right protest action for most of the 1990s are much more likely to go unnoticed (Mudde, 2016).[8] If all protests constitute a public opinion signal, the scale of collective action is informative of whether protesters address a large public – as in large-scale national gatherings seeking change for a broad share of the population – or rather a smaller audience – as in less participated local mobilizations demanding small-scale improvements (Elliott et al., 2016). Accordingly, we expect that:

H2a: *media coverage is more likely for large-scale national events than for local-level ones.*

Furthermore, the newsworthiness of protests depends on the issue that protesters seek to highlight. Researchers recognize that journalists are particularly responsive when political actors address issues over which they have built a reputation. This is coherent with notions of issue "ownership" in comparative politics, and issue "attention cycles" in social movement studies (McCarthy et al., 1996).

[7] Due to missing information, we could not address potentially relevant factors such as the actual number of participants and protest duration (Biggs, 2018). Newspapers in fact often do not report on the number of participants to demonstrations, which is why we used a proxy based on information about the scope and location of protest (see methods section). To compensate for the missing information on the duration of events, we ran the models with an item measuring the Google Trends visibility of each far-right collective actor (see Annex C), and found no major variation from the full model (see Andretta & Pavan, 2018).

[8] Our data is based on articles from mainstream national newspapers (which are generally located in capital cities) and therefore is not well suited to test for the effect of the location of news media organizations. Since Germany is likely to deviate from the comparative pattern (due to its federal system and mass media environment), we confirmed the robustness of the findings by re-running the main models excluding this country case (See Annex C).

Issue ownership implies that, for the public, a given actor is more credible than its competitors at handling a given problem. For journalists, this means that the actor also constitutes a reliable source of news on that topic (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). The far right is likely to enjoy this reputational advantage on immigration: while this is no longer its only or exclusive domain (Mudde, 1999; Spanje, 2010), journalists might struggle to recognize its competence on other topics. Social movement studies suggest a distinct mechanism by which the sudden ascendance to prominence of a given topic may influence the short-term newsworthiness of protests on that issue (McCarthy et al., 1996, p. 481). Considering the proclivity of the news media for stories dealing with so-called new cultural issues (Bornschier, 2010; Thesen, 2018), the media climate or "discursive opportunities" are likely to be favourable to far-right protests focusing on migration. Put differently, we expect that the media will consider far-right protest on immigration particularly newsworthy and that:

> H2b: *media coverage is more likely for far-right protest events focusing on immigration than for those focusing on any other issue*.

Lastly, the tactics of protest affect the amount of coverage. Collective actors have a whole repertoire of different action forms, ranging from uncontentious means of protest like peaceful public meetings or assemblies, to more provocative ones such as street marches and rallies, and even highly contentious ones such as confrontational and violent actions. While peaceful protests have become normalized, disruptive contention remains less legitimate but often attracts more news coverage (Myers & Caniglia, 2004; Oliver & Maney, 2000). Excessive disruption may lead protesters to fall into the sphere of criminal behaviour (Wasow, 2020) or "deviance" (Hallin, 1989), which is generally associated to negative news reporting. In terms of the extent of coverage, however, social movement studies have pointed out that news media are generally sensitive to the "logics of damage" in collective action (Della Porta & Diani, 2020). Hence, we expect that far-right protest resting on contentious tactics holds a higher news value, or that:

H2c: *media coverage is more likely for far-right protest events based on contentious tactics than for those based on peaceful and conventional ones*.

Our third hypothesis considers whether protest actions generate controversy and drama via counter-protesting. The far right is known for getting media attention via the reactions it generates (Ellinas, 2020), and previous research contended that demonstrations by the Ku Klux Klan have been considered newsworthy mainly because of riots and arrests that ensued (Reynolds-Stenson & Earl, 2018; Smith et al., 2001). More generally, the presence of controversy around a demonstration, or disorderliness in the form of street counter-mobilisation, is found to increase the likelihood of coverage, albeit generally also detracting attention away from protesters' initial motives and issues (McCarhty et al, 1996). Contentious counter-mobilization might thus have the (unintended) effect of increasing the interest of reporters for far-right protest, including for otherwise marginal events (Bail, 2012). As such, we expect that far-right events that are met with street counter-protests by political opponents will hold stronger news value and will receive higher media attention, or that:

H3: *media coverage is more likely for protest events that provoke street counter-mobilization than for those that do not trigger counter-protesting.*

Data and methods

The hypotheses are tested using the original FARPE dataset systematically measuring protest events by far-right collective actors across 11 European countries between 2008 and 2018.[9]

In each country, we used country knowledge and secondary literature about the national far-right scene to identify the far-right collective actor (social movement, movement party, or political party)

[9] Replication data are available on CPS Harvard Dataverse. Castelli Gattinara, Pietro; Froio, Caterina, 2023, "Replication Data for: When the Far Right Makes the News: Protest Characteristics and Media Coverage of Far-Right Mobilization in Europe", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/3UYOTH, Harvard Dataverse, V1.

that has engaged the most in extra-parliamentary mobilisations over the observed time span.[10] While this strategy does not allow to measure the full extent of far-right protest mobilization in a given country, our 'actor-centered' approach permits to come as close as possible to a full list of all protest events in which the selected actors have partaken. The dataset comprises protest events coded from the press releases published by these actors on their websites (which we consider as input for earned media coverage following Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010), as well as protest events retrieved from quality newspapers (the output). The dependent variable measures media attention indicating whether each protest event identified in far-right websites met subsequent coverage in newspaper articles. The multivariate analysis consists of logistic regressions predicting media coverage (*output*) from the characteristics of protest events in online press releases (*input*).

Research design

The study covers 11 European countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). The case selection rests on the ambition to cover different countries within the EU (all cases are member states during the observed timeframe), which differ systematically with regard to the political and discursive opportunities for far-right protest mobilization, and thus account for the variation in protest activity by different types of far-right collective actors (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Caramani & Manucci, 2019; Titley et al., 2021). The timeframe of this study allows to control for contextual transformations that are likely to have an impact on far-right mobilization and its visibility, and notably the economic and cultural impact of the global financial crisis in 2008 and the 2015 EU migration policy crisis.

Dependent variable

[10] The list of actors is available in the Appendix. The full codebook and coding instructions are available upon request.

Our dependent variable is a simple dummy variable reflecting whether far-right protest events promoted via online press releases are subsequently covered in newspaper articles or not.[11] Media-based protest event analysis (PEA) is a standard procedure to quantify protest mobilization in social movement research (Hutter, 2014a), and yet no large-scale cross-national dataset covering far-right protest over time exists to date. Our data thus constitutes the first protest event dataset allowing for the quantitative analysis of far-right protest mobilization across Western and Eastern Europe in the medium term. While protest event analysis ultimately treats words as numbers, it also allows integrating more substantive details and insight from the data sources.

Data were collected through a semi-automated procedure by the project FARPE, which relies on two sources: first, press releases from the news section of the websites of the main far-right groups initiating protest in each country. These constitute a reliable, albeit partisan, source of information on the occurrence of protest events, which groups make available to followers, external observers, and journalists (Nitschke et al., 2016; Rone, 2022). Previous studies also confirm that this info often also reproduces the basic text that groups share by on social media (Fielitz & Thurston, 2019).[12] Second, we collected data from the main quality newspaper in each country, selected for their reputation and national distribution (Wouters, 2015), which is justified since this type of outlets report on political issues more extensively than any other type of newspapers, and their editorial decisions often influence those of other media outlets.[13] To strengthen the comparative design of the study, we

[11] While this is standard procedure in research on media coverage using protest event data (eg. Wouters 2013), it does not allow to dig into the 'quality' of news reporting (in terms of tone of coverage), nor to qualify it in terms of mentions or column space.

[12] Moreover, collective actors use social media in different ways (Mattoni, 2017), as some groups try to avoid using public platforms (Golden Dawn), while others incur sanctions or censorship (Les Identitaires) (see e.g. Froio, 2018; Sprejer et al., 2022). The choice of websites thus also ensured a certain consistency across cases.

[13] In fact, mainstream quality newspapers still constitute the most prominent digital news entities: they remain highly legitimate sources and set the agenda of most other outlets including social media (Gottfried & Shearer, 2016).

included only independent outlets with nationwide coverage and readership, and limited the selection to one outlet per country. A test for possible news outlet selection bias was performed by comparing the results produced by our keyword string on the target outlets and on other mainstream quality newspapers (using the Factiva archives of a sample period of one year), which showed only marginal differences (below 10 per cent, see Table A4 in the Supplementary Information). A discussion of how our figures compare with available data from projects that opted for different sources, sampling strategies and search strings is available in the Supplementary Information.

Article selection, the coding of protest events and the tests for intercoder reliability followed standard procedures from previous comparative projects, detailed in the Supplementary Information (Berkhout et al. 2015). The combination of the two sources resulted in a unique data set covering 5,972 protest events in the 11 countries, of which 3,794 in online press releases, 2,178 in newspapers, and 480 in both sources (12.6 per cent).[14] The latter constitutes the dependent variable of this study. Matching the data from the two sources was done in two steps: first, we asked coders to assign the same ID value to events appearing in *both* newspapers and websites. We then checked the accuracy of the matching by means of a double-blinded coding of the action and date of events described in newspapers, and those in the online press releases. Each protest event identified in far-right websites was thus coded as 1 if it met subsequent media coverage, and 0 otherwise.

Main independent variables

The independent variables measure characteristics of groups, protest events, and counter-protests. To study the effect of groups promoting protest, we differentiate their *organizational type* based on case

[14] More precisely, the dataset comprises three types of protest events: events that feature online but do not receive newspapers coverage (N=3,314); events that feature online and receive media coverage (N=480); and events that are covered in newspapers, but not in online press releases (N=1,698). Substantively, the latter have been excluded because they are protests that involve far-right actors but that are not explicitly endorsed by them. Lacking information about the input for earned media coverage, these events could not be used in the present study (Castelli Gattinara & Froio, 2023). Additional information can be found in Table 1 below and in the Appendix.

knowledge regarding their degree of institutionalization. Notably, we distinguish far-right collective actors primarily involved in electoral politics (i.e. consistently fielding candidates for national elections over the observed period: political parties =1), and actors that operate exclusively or predominantly at the grassroots level (i.e. social movement organizations =2). Furthermore, we rely on the European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook to define these collective actors' *representation* in public office, i.e. the share of seats or MPs in national/European parliament for each year in the study timeframe. As regards protest event characteristics, we construct a measure of the *issue focus* indicating whether an event is primarily about a specific domain, notably immigration, the EU, economy and welfare, law and order, and civil rights. We further distinguish events in terms of *protest scale*, drawing information about the scope (national or local events) and the location of events (within or without national capitals). The resulting variable thus distinguishes: 1- local events outside capital cities (proxy for small events); 2- local events in capital cities (medium-small events); 3- national events outside capital cities (medium-large events); and 4- national events in capital cities (large events proxy). Furthermore, we identify the *tactics* of mobilization, namely the main form of action of each protest event. For this, we follow existing classifications (Hutter, 2014a) of non-contentious actions (i.e. peaceful meetings, public gatherings and assemblies =0), moderately contentious ones (i.e. authorized street marches or rallies =1) and highly contentious actions (i.e. confrontational actions, blockades or violent protests =2). Finally, we built a variable measuring whether any protest event provoked *counter-protest*, understood as any form of counter-mobilization in the streets: we coded 0 for events that produced no or simply verbal reactions by other political actors, and 1 for events triggering some form of street counter-protests, such as counter-actions, boycotts, and clashes with political opponents.[15]

[15] We purposedly excluded 'verbal' reactions (such as interviews and statements by non-far-right opponents) from the category of counter-mobilization, which only includes 'physical' reactions in the streets. While it can reasonably be expected that street counter-protesting increases the likelihood of events being covered, the same causal direction does not necessarily hold for verbal statements. Indeed, working with newspaper data, we cannot distinguish between a) verbal 'reactions' that *signal the newsworthiness of an event*, and b) the comments and reactions that *journalists collect only once they have decided to cover a given event* (see e.g. Wouters, 2016). In the appendix, we test the separate effects of

Contextual factors and controls

To highlight potential unobserved factors related to contextual differences and to put actors' mobilization and media coverage into their political context, the models also consider political and discursive opportunity structures for far-right protest mobilization, the configuration of national media systems in the 11 countries, and a set of control variables.

We broadly interpret political and discursive opportunities as the 'openness' of the political system to collective action (della Porta, 2022). Specifically, political opportunity structures (POS) refer to formal institutional configurations in a political system that might favor mobilization. Discursive opportunities (DOS) identify the legitimate ideas in the broader political culture which could facilitate the resonance of specific collective action frames in the public sphere (McCammon, 2022). Concerning political opportunity structures, we include three indicators: first, we check for protests taking place ahead of national elections, because electoral cycles might offer favorable circumstances for mobilization (McAdam & Tarrow, 2010); second, we control for the share of votes obtained by the dominant radical right party at the most recent national elections, because representation in public office – especially at the national level – provides access to material resources that can be used to sustain protest (Castelli Gattinara et al., 2022); third, we measure the availability of institutional access points using the *divided party control index* from V-DEM[16], based on the general notion that divided systems offer multiple channels of inclusion for protest actors and (Kitschelt, 2002).

As regards discursive opportunity structures, we consider four items that could influence the resonance of far-right core claims across different national public spheres: the sheer number of migrants and refugees reaching the country on a given year,[17] the public salience of immigration

verbal reactions and street countermobilization and confirm the robustness of the results for our hypothesis (see Annex C, Table 6a).

[16] Varieties of Democracy database (Coppedge et al., 2020), www.v-dem.net. Positive values indicate divided government, whereas negative ones mean that a single party controls the executive and legislative branches.

[17] OECD, International Migration Database (https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG).

across national settings (share of people considering this issue the most important problem in the country),[18] and the presence of legal bans on extremist parties and far-right groups, which might hamper the opportunities of far-right actors to mobilize in the streets, and is measured using a specific indicator on yearly party bans available in the V-DEM dataset.[19]

In addition to discursive opportunities, distinctive media systems are often associated with different agenda setting mechanisms, and with varying levels of attention to political news (Strömbäck & Dimitrova, 2006). Hence, we created a variable to account for standing differences in media ecologies, comparing the 11 countries in terms of Hallin and Mancini's "Polarised pluralist", "Democratic corporatist" and "Liberal" models of national media systems, integrated for Central and Eastern European country cases (Hallin and Mancini, 2012).

Finally, the models control for possible confounding factors due to certain far-right groups being better known to journalists than others: either because they have existed for longer (i.e. organization age measured in years since foundation), or because of their higher level of activity (the intensity of mobilization over the six months preceding each event, measured as the lagged aggregate number of protests). The descriptive statistics are reported in Annex B, Supplementary Information.

Results: far-right protests that get media attention

Cross-national variation in newspaper coverage of far-right protest events

How many protest events do far-right actors promote in different countries? And how many of these make it from online press releases to quality newspaper coverage? This section considers variation in

[18] Eurobarometer 2008–2018.

[19] Varieties of Democracy database (Coppedge et al., 2020), www.v-dem.net.

newspaper coverage of far-right protest events across countries and over time (Table 1, Figure 1, Table 2).

For each of the 11 countries under study, Table 1 shows the protest events that are mentioned in online press releases (*input*) and subsequently covered by newspapers (*output*). Not all far-right collective actors mobilize to the same extent, not all of them are equally inclined to promoting their activities via press-releases, and – most importantly – not all of their promoted events are equally likely to be covered in the media. As expected, only a small share of the promoted events ultimately features in news reports (480 events, or 13 per cent of the total), albeit with important cross-country variation. In absolute numbers, France is the first country for number of events reported in newspapers (68 events) but ranks only sixth if we consider the events promoted by far-right groups via their own website (434 events). At the opposite end, Estonia presents the lowest number of events promoted online, but the highest share of coverage (46 out of 70 events covered). Overall, visibility ranges from a maximum of 65 per cent in Estonia to just 3 per cent in Greece. Coverage is above average in countries like Slovakia and the United Kingdom, and below average in countries where far-right mobilization is very high, notably in Italy.

Table 1. Protest events in online press releases and with newspaper coverage, by country

Country	**Events in online press releases**	**Events with coverage**	**%**
Estonia	70	46	65,7
UK	117	33	28,2
Slovakia	253	61	24,1
Bulgaria	258	45	17,4
Germany	223	36	16,1
France	434	68	15,7
Sweden	271	41	15,1
Austria	83	12	14,5
Poland	567	66	11,6
Italy	1076	59	5,5
Greece	442	13	2,9
Total	**3794**	**480**	**12,7**

Figure 1 shows the yearly number of far-right protest events in online press releases (*input*) that are also found in newspaper articles (*output*). The aggregate graph in the top left corner reveals considerable variation in coverage over time, confirming the relevance of studying the drivers of media selection bias in the coverage of far-right collective action. Coverage fluctuates over time, with spikes in 2010, 2013 and 2016, which hints at possible effects of the consequences of the eurozone crisis, and European asylum policy crisis.

The individual country graphs offer further evidence of cross-national variation in patterns of media coverage of far-right protest mobilization. A first group of countries display modest linear increases in coverage, from 2013 onwards. This includes Estonia, Germany and Greece, countries where the Great Recession had strong consequences for the political system in general, and for far-right parties like the Conservative People's Party of Estonia (EKRE), Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Golden Dawn in particular. A second group displays a more punctuated spike in coverage: in Italy, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom around 2010–2011; in Bulgaria and France in 2012–2013, and after 2014 in Poland and Sweden, which points at the importance of national-level factors to explain variation in coverage.

Figure 1. Yearly number of far-right protest events promoted online and covered in newspapers, by country (2008–2018)



Table 2 offers initial insights on the determinants of coverage of far-right protest mobilization, based on logistic regression models predicting media attention from context level factors linked to political and discursive opportunity structures (Model 1). The model is then run separately by integrating national media system differences (Model 2), and individual country dummies (Model 3).

Table 2. Logistic regression: impact of context-level factors on media attention (output)

DV: media coverage of far-right protest	Baseline Model 1 B	SE	e^B	Media System Model 2 B	SE	e^B	Country dummies Model 3 B	SE	e^B
Political opportunity structures									
Election year	0,10	0,11	1,11	0,80	0,11	1,08	0,01	0,13	1,00
Share of vote for main RRPPs	0,00	0,12	0,99	-0,01	0,01	0,99	0,00	0,02	0,99
Institutional access points	-0,21 **	0,08	0,80	-0,26 **	0,08	0,77	-0,04	0,10	0,96
Discursive opportunity structures									
Annual inflow of migrants[a]	0,00	0,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	1,00
Annual inflow of refugees[a]	0,00	0,00	0,99	0,00	0,00	0,99	0,00	0,00	0,99
Most important problem (% immigration)	0,03 ***	0,01	1,02	0,02 ***	0,01	1,02	0,03 ***	0,00	1,03
Bans on far-right actors	-1,11 ***	0,21	0,32	-0,84 ***	0,24	0,43	-0,36	0,30	0,69
Media system (ref. Polarised pluralist)									
Democratic corporatist				0,52 **	0,24	1,70			
Liberal model				0,20	0,35	1,22			
CEE Model				0,43 **	0,18	1,54			
Country dummies (ref. France)									
Austria							0,53	0,68	1,70
Bulgaria							-0,57	0,48	0,56
Estonia							2,95 ***	0,57	19,13
Germany							0,56	0,94	1,75
Greece							-3,69 **	1,29	0,02
Italy							-1,69 ***	0,46	0,19
Poland							0,37	0,49	1,44
Slovakia							1,05 **	0,45	2,86
Sweden							-1,75	1,06	0,17
United Kingdom							0,76	0,65	2,14
Control variables									
Year	-0,01 **	0,01	0,98	-0,01	0,02	0,99	-0,21 **	0,06	0,81
Organization age (in years)	0,07	0,02	0,92	-0,01 ***	0,01	0,93	0,10	0,06	1,10
Intensity of mobilization	-0,01 ***	0,00	0,98	-0,01 ***	0,00	0,99	0,00	0,00	1,00
Constant	-0,09	0,22	0,91	-0,52	0,32	0,59	-2,74 ***	0,78	0,06
N	3650			3650			3650		
-2 log likelihood	-1282,5			-1278,1			-1237,9		
Pseudo-R^2	0,08			0,08			0,11		
$\chi 2$ (d.f.)	230,91(10) ***			239,49(13) ***			320,02(20) ***		

**** P<0.001; ** P<0.05; *P<0.1*

[a] In thousands

The baseline model shows that certain political and discursive opportunity structures matter in explaining cross-national differences in the coverage of far-right protests. Most notably, the salience of the immigration issue in public opinion is linked positively to the likelihood that the media report on far-right events, and the results are consistent across all models. As regards other national-level factors, institutional access points and the presence of legal bans on far-right actors have a negative impact on coverage, but the effect does not hold once we control for country dummies. In this respect,

these preliminary findings seem to suggest that the expected news value of far-right protest mobilization increases at times in which larger shares of population perceive immigration as a problem, irrespective of the actual numbers of immigrants or refugees entering the country.

Model 2 confirms that there are cross-country differences in the likelihood of coverage but offers a more complex picture than the one observed with descriptive statistics: it suggests that, compared to the Polarized Pluralist model of southern Europe (France, Greece, Italy), far-right protest events have higher chances to make the news in the Democratic Corporatist media systems characterizing the German, Austrian and Swedish contexts, as well as in Central and Eastern European systems. The inclusion of country dummies provides additional information: we see that the events promoted by a far-right actors in smaller countries like Estonia and Slovakia have significantly higher chances to feature in newspapers than their equivalents in France (chosen as reference category for it scores the median value in Table 1), whereas contexts characterized by higher levels of mobilization like Greece and Italy also display significantly lower likelihoods of coverage.

Overall, these initial findings illustrate that there is considerable cross-national variation in the extent to which far-right actors promote protest mobilization via online press releases, and in the extent to which national newspapers report on collective action. Yet, we also find little systematic evidence supporting cross-national accounts for this variation, notably in terms of a country's model of media/politics relations, and available political opportunity structures.

Protest characteristics and newspaper coverage of far-right events

To what extent can temporal and cross-national differences be explained by protest input characteristics? In this section, we focus on the linkage between newspaper coverage of far-right protest events and the characteristics of protest initiators, protest events and counter-mobilization (Table 3, Table 4, Figure 2).

Table 3 displays the number of events promoted online and receiving coverage, by type of initiators, protest characteristics and counter-protest – the main independent variables of this study. It offers some initial evidence that the media report more on far-right protests that take place at the national level, focus on issues such as immigration and the EU, adopt contentious tactics, and trigger reactions by opponents. Examples of these scenarios include media coverage of the brutal attacks on refugee camps in Greece (for which, however, far-right organizations seldom claim responsibility), or non-contentious initiatives that trigger public outcry like a 2008 rally organized by the German National Democratic Party (NPD) in the town where Adolf Hitler wrote *Mein Kampf,*[20] or the provocative "sausage and wine aperitif" by the French Identitaires, who distributed glasses of wine and pork sausages in a migrant neighborhood of Paris to trigger Muslim residents.[21] In sum, this preliminary descriptive evidence supports the idea that specific characteristics of events promoted by far-right actors via their online platforms enlighten when and why they subsequently feature in the news.

Table 3. Independent variables descriptive statistics, online press releases and events with coverage

	Variables	**Events in online press releases**	**Events with coverage**	**%**
Protest initiators	*Organizational type*			
	Political parties	1124	153	13,6
	Social movement org.	2670	327	12,2
	Representation			
	Groups with MPs	921	95	10,3
	Groups without MPs	2873	385	13,4
Protest characteristics	*Issue Focus*			
	Immigration	741	117	15,8
	EU	111	24	21,6
	Economy and Welfare	669	57	8,5
	Law and Order	189	22	11,6
	Civil Rights	309	36	11,7

[20] *Suddeutsche Zeitung*, 28/11/2008, "Entsetzen im Dachau-Komitee; Ehemalige KZ-Häftlinge kritisieren NPD-Aufmarsch in Landsberg als Verhöhnung der Opfer".

[21] *Le Monde*, 16/06/2010, "Extrême droite : l'apéro 'saucisson et pinard' de la Goutte-d'Or interdit", available here.

	Scale			
	Local demo outside capital	2220	172	7,7
	Local demo in capital	242	20	8,2
	National demo outside capital	424	84	10,2
	National demo in capital	751	176	23,4
	Tactics			
	Non-contentious	1383	84	6,1
	Moderately contentious	1423	243	17,1
	Highly contentious	988	153	15,5
Counter-protest				
	No street reaction	3383	343	10,1
	Street counter-protests	411	137	33,3
	N (%)	3794	480	12,7

Table 4 presents the results of a logistic regression model predicting media attention to far-right protest from the characteristics of protest initiators, protest events, and counter-mobilization. The baseline model contains the effects for control variables only, including country-level differences linked to the media system. The input variables are then integrated stepwise for each set of hypotheses, so that the full model tests all main effects of protest characteristics (*input*) on media attention (*output*).

Table 4. Logistic regression: impact of protest characteristics (input) on media attention (output)

DV: media coverage of far-right protest	Protest initiators Model 4			Protest characteristics Model 5			Full model Model 6		
	B	SE	e^B	B	SE	e^B	B	SE	e^B
Group characteristics									
Social movement org. (ref. Political party)	0,15	0,13	1,16	-0,10	0,14	0,90	-0,21	0,14	0,81
Groups with elected MPs	0,03	0,17	1,03	-0,08	0,18	0,92	-0,10	0,18	0,90
Issue focus									
Immigration				0,65 ***	0,16	1.91	0,63 ***	0.,16	1,87
EU				0,33	0,32	1,39	0,34	0,32	1,41
Economy and Welfare				-0,21	0,18	0,80	-0,18	0,19	0,83
Law and Order				0,15	0,26	1,22	0,25	0,26	1,28
Civil Rights				0,25	0,21	1,26	-0,08	0,22	0,92
Protest Scale (ref. Local)									
Local events in capital cities				-0,42	0,16	0,65	-0,30	0,26	0,74
National events outside capital cities				0,51 **	0,18	1,66	0,45 **	0,19	1,57
National events in capital cities				1,13 ***	0,14	3,11	1,02 ***	0,14	2,78
Tactics (ref. Non-contentious)									
Moderately contentious				0,89 ***	0,16	2,44	0,73 ***	0,16	2,09
Highly contentious				0,86 ***	0,17	2,37	0,74 ***	0,17	2,10
Counter-protest (ref. No)									
Street counter-mobilization							1,54 ***	0,18	4,69
Political opportunity structures									
Election year	0.09	0,12	1.09	0,17	0,12	1,18	0,13	0,13	1,14
Share of vote for main RRPPs	-0,01	0,01	0,99	-0,14	0,02	0,98	0,00	0,02	1,00
Institutional access points	-0,26 *	0,08	0,76	-0,14	0,09	0,87	-0,10	0,09	0,91
Discursive opportunity structures									
Annual inflow of migrants[a]	0,00	0,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	0,00	0,00	1,00
Annual inflow of refugees[a]	0,00 *	0,00	0,99	0,00 *	0,00	0,99	0,00	0,00	0,99
Most important problem (% immigration)	0,02 **	0,01	1,02	0,02 **	0,01	1,02	0,02 **	0,01	1,02
Bans on far-right actors	-0,84 ***	0,24	0,43	-0,48 **	0,26	0,62	-0,78 **	0,27	0,46
Media system (ref. Polarised pluralist)									
Democratic corporatist	0,53 *	0,24	1,70	0,50 *	0.27	1,65	-0,33	0,30	0,71
Liberal model	0,21	0,35	1,24	-0,05	0,40	0,95	-1,07 *	0,43	0,34
CEE Model	0,54 **	0,20	1,72	0,51 *	0,23	1,67	0,37	0,24	1,45
Control variables									
Year	-0,01	0,02	0,99	0,00	0,02	0,97	-0,04	0,03	0,96
Organization age (in years)	-0,06 ***	0,01	0,94	-0,05 ***	0,01	0,94	-0,07 ***	0,01	0,93
Intensity of mobilization	-0,01 ***	0,00	0,98	-0,01 **	0,00	0,99	-0,01 **	0,00	0,99
Constant	-0,87 *	0,22	0,41	-1,94 ***	0,49	0,14	-1,50 **	0,52	0,22
N	3650			3495			3485		
-2 log likelihood	-1277,5			-1135,32			-1101,99		
Pseudo-R^2	0,09			0,14			0,17		
$\chi 2$ (d.f.)	240,87(51) ***			373,12(25) ***			441,77(26) ***		

**** P<0.001; ** P<0.05; *P<0.1*

[a] In thousands

Note: Annex C in the Supplementary Information reports model specification and goodness of fit test statistics for the full model. Robustness checks for multicollinearity, outliers (Pearson residuals), and unequal distribution across country cases confirm that there is no change in the significance levels of our main predictors.

The full model shows that the predicted factors perform well, as confirmed by the increased model fit (pseudo R2=0.17) compared to the baseline (R2=0.09). The test of the full model is statistically significant against a constant-only model, indicating that the predictors reliably distinguish whether the online press releases are covered in the media or not (the full model is statistically significant, Chi-square = 441.77, *p.*<0.001 with *df* 26).

The results in the full model are supportive of two of our three main hypotheses. The characteristics of protest initiators do not predict the coverage for far-right mobilization: neither the effect for the type of organization promoting protest events (H1a), nor that for the availability of MPs in representative institutions, reaches statistical significance (H1b). Essentially, the organizational type of far-right collective actors engaging in protest mobilization does not seem to affect the attention of news organizations. We see this as a confirmation of the view – supported by a growing body of research – that the contemporary far-right blurs the lines between electoral and protest politics (Castelli Gattinara & Pirro, 2019), and that the empirical boundaries between political parties in the streets, and social movements running for elections are becoming increasingly fuzzy (Borbáth & Hutter, 2020; Della Porta et al., 2017; McAdam & Tarrow, 2010).

In addition, we find that the scale and issue focus of protest events matter for media coverage: the media are more attracted to high-scale far-right protests (i.e. national-level and in capital cities, H2a) which focus on immigration (H2b). Furthermore, there is a significant effect for the tactics of protest action (H2c), with a higher likelihood of coverage for moderately and highly contentious episodes when compared to non-contentious ones. Whilst the structure of our data does not allow to make statistical inferences about the impact of tactics on the tone of coverage, the substantive reading of the news stories confirms that violent or confrontational events are described in overwhelmingly negative terms by the quality press. This is in line with previous research which found that contentious acts are mostly covered in terms of deviance or criminal

behavior (Wasow, 2020), and that the prominence of right-wing protests is mainly linked to threats rather than policy gains (Amenta & Elliott, 2017). The full model also confirms that the media are more likely to focus on protests that provoke street counter-protest by political opponents (H3). As observed in the previous section, some of the effects are context-dependent: the opportunities for media coverage of far-right protest events tend to be lower in countries enforcing bans on far-right actors and symbols, and higher when discursive opportunities are favorable, such as when immigration is a salient issue in public opinion.[22]

The last column in Table 4 shows the odds ratios for our models, namely the odds that media coverage will occur for each of our main predictors. To ease the interpretation of the results, Figure 2 below plots graphically the odds ratios and confidence intervals for the main independent variables.

Figure 2. Impact of protest characteristics (input) on news coverage (output). Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals

[22] A separate model was run to check for the possible effect of the European asylum policy crisis in 2015, but the results do not vary substantially (see Annex C).



The highest odds are associated with the presence of counter-protest in the streets (OR=4.69), indicating that media attention is primarily driven by chains of actions and reactions between far-righters and their opponents. Events that trigger counter-mobilization are in fact easier for journalists to identify because they imply violent confrontations between opposing camps – such as Golden Dawn and anti-fascist activists during the Great Recession in Greece.[23] These counter-protests often had the unintended effect of creating the conflict frames that were then picked up by the media. In some circumstances, counter-mobilization in the streets ended up compensating for the protesters' limited support and visibility, turning otherwise marginal events into sensationalist and entertaining stories, thus facilitating access of far-right fringe groups to the news.

[23] *Kathimerini*, 26/01/2018, "Το δημοτικό συμβούλιο Χίου κήρυξε «ανεπιθύμητα» στο νησί τα στελέχη της Χρυσής Αυγής, available here.

Furthermore, the media are more likely to cover large-scale protests (national events in capital cities OR=2.78) and events whereby the far right adopted highly (OR=2.10) or moderately contentious tactics (OR=2.09). Italian newspapers reported regularly on the unauthorized street events or provocative parades against technocracy by the far-right *CasaPound Italia* (CPI),[24] but did not cover its more conventional initiatives,[25] such as public assemblies to publicize a new economic agenda (Froio et al., 2020). Similarly, in 2016–2017 the Polish movement *Ruch Narodowy* failed to reach the news with its anti-feminist gatherings on Women's Day,[26] but obtained visibility by storming a theatre to halt a show considered offensive to the Polish Catholic church.[27] Overall, if most far-right protests fail to hit the media because they involve a few activists marching in small provincial towns, far-right protests based on moderate or highly contentious repertoires are considerably more compelling for news organizations.

Finally, we find that the media are not neutral to the reputation of far-right actors on immigration (OR=1.87). The German media reported systematically on Pegida's street marches on the asylum "crisis" and the "Islamization" of Europe,[28] and much less so on protest actions that are less readily associated with the far right, such as the rallies against climate change or those about unemployment and the economy by AfD.[29] In this respect, media visibility seems to be associated with the "core" cultural themes of the far right, most notably migration and

[24] *www.casapounditalia.org*, 12/12/2013, "Alcuni italiani non si arrendono", available here.

[25] *www.casapounditalia.org*, 03/05/2015, "Torino: CasaPound nei mercati per promuovere dillo a casapound, sportelli di aiuto alle famiglie e ai lavoratori", available here.

[26] *www.onr.com.pl*, 09/03/2016, "Rzeszów: Manifestacja antyfeministyczna", available here.

[27] *www.ruchnarodowy.net*, 04/08/2017, "Protest przeciwko 'Klątwie' w Chorzowie", available here.

[28] *Pegida Official Facebook Page*, 06/07/2017, "Demo in Pirna: Andreas Kalbitz zu Gas", available here.

[29] *Pegida Official Facebook Page*, 12/03/2018, "AfD Kundgebung, Zukunft Lausitz - Arbeitsplätze sichern!", available here.

ethnic minority issues, with journalists implicitly accepting that the far right has acquired a certain reputation for addressing, or handling, these domains.

Conclusions

The study of the drivers of news coverage of far-right protest has crucial implications to understand the cultural impact of these actors and their ideas on contemporary societies. While the fact that the media report on the far right does not unequivocally mean that they support it, media attention often has the (unintended) effect of giving social standing to far-right causes: in the long run, it contributes to transforming the sphere of legitimate controversy (Hallin, 1989), eroding the boundaries between what is considered acceptable in the public sphere (de Jonge & Gaufman, 2022; Wodak, 2021). Given the relevance of these questions, it is surprising that the study of the linkage between the media and protest has not been expanded to the far right in Europe.

Building on research on social movements and the far right, this paper has argued that the coverage of far-right protests in the news depends on the extent to which the characteristics of protest events match media preferences and attention. Specifically, we built on a classic input-output process model of selection bias in media attention, which we expanded and adapted to the case of far-right mobilization, and then tested on a new comparative dataset comparing far-right protest in 11 EU countries from 2008 to 2018.

Our analysis shows that far-right protest events in online press releases, and their media coverage, differs considerably across Europe, but that this cannot be fully accounted for by factors related to the political system or the model of media/politics relations. In line with our expectations, we find that news media react differently depending on crucial characteristics of far-right events, responding more promptly to large-scale protests, those addressing issues on

which the far right has built a reputation such as immigration, those involving moderate or highly contentious tactics, and those triggering a response in the streets by political opponents. Hence, although our data allow no direct comparison, we provide support for the idea that there are similar paths to media coverage for far-right movements and non-right ones. The results confirm that coverage of protests is subject to media bias, and that whilst cultural and discursive contexts matter, media attention is mainly driven by event characteristics that carry a specific news value for journalists (Wouters, 2015). If we cannot dig into the 'quality' of this media reporting to see if 'all publicity is good publicity' also for the far right (Amenta & Elliott, 2017), our findings suggest that right-wing protest mobilization gets visibility more because of its style and tactics than because of the specific features and societal relevance of protest initiators, a finding in line with recent research pointing at the role of the mass media in sensationalizing and amplifying the influence of the far right on society (Brown & Mondon, 2021).

In this respect, the mechanisms of media bias that we identified are part of a broader story. Media biases are not limited to protest event characteristics only, but also depend on the political leaning of editorial boards, journalistic practices, and on the nature of digital and print news outlets (Schroeder, 2019). It is also worth discussing the different logics driving the strategies of the actors that make up the media landscape (e.g. commercial media and the public service), including the ethical standards and commercial interests that lead certain news organizations to be more thirst for entertaining stories and sensationalistic sound-bites than others (de Jonge, 2019). As a result, the mechanisms of media bias are tightly linked to the way in which protesters frame public demands, the involvement of large-membership organizations and charismatic leaders in the protest network (Ellinas 2020), as well as the socio-demographic profile of protesters – i.e. their age, status and gender (Klandermans & Mayer, 2006; Miller-Idriss, 2020), which we could only address indirectly with the data at stake (Caren et al., 2020).

In acknowledging these limitations, we also wish to point out that the input-output framework proposed here could be usefully expanded in the future to account for other dimensions of news coverage, the diversified spaces that characterize contemporary media environments, and the symbolic and discursive aspects of protest action. We believe that such developments would be particularly suited to assessing the extent to which far-right ideas become legitimate in public debates.

Our results pave the way to understanding the characteristics of far-right protest events that may foster the social standing of extremist ideas. If extant research shows that policymakers respond to progressive movements' demands when these manage to set mass media agendas, news coverage may similarly enable grassroots far-right groups and ideas. As far-right protesters obtain visibility in the press, and their purposes become recurring news items, ultra-conservative positions gradually flow across ideological strands (Blee & Creasap, 2010); as these ideas move from the fringes to the mainstream, they permeate the agendas of governing parties, and ultimately influence their positions on migration, gender and security (Mondon & Winter, 2020). In this way, far-right groups might permeate the sphere of legitimate debate and, from there, influence government agendas and public opinion, without necessarily increasing their societal rooting or mobilization potential.

In sum, we believe that these findings have implications that go beyond the study of (far-right) social movements and apply to all scholars interested in understanding how political communication processes affect politics and society. In this regard, we hope that our empirical study of far-right protest mobilization paves the way to a broader research agenda expanding the proposed framework theoretically – integrating mechanisms of coverage in hybrid media environments – and empirically – expanding the scope beyond Europe and the far right (Gagnon, 2020; Weiner & Zellman, 2022). Given the growing visibility of far-right contentious action, exemplified by the 2021 storming of the US Capitol building, anti-containment protests

and 2023 Brazilian congress attack (Hunger et al., 2023), the FARPE data is set to play a major role in this research agenda.

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Annex A. The Protest Event Dataset

Coder and source reliabiltiy

To identify and code protest events, we instructed six research assistants proficient with one or more languages of the country cases. Following previous studies, coders were first asked to identify relevant coding units in newspaper articles, with the help of an actor-centered keyword search on Factiva and Lexis-Nexis (Berkhout et al. 2015). As a second step, coders then integrated this information with data derived from the websites of the main groups included in the search string (Table A1). In both sources, coders were asked to identify protest events in which far right actors partake, using the standard definition of a protest event as a collective, public action, organised by a far-right collective actor with the explicit purpose of expressing critique or dissent (Hutter 2014). They were then asked to code protest events according to 23 variables using the project codebook, and notably to assign the same ID value when events appeared in *both* newspapers and websites. We then double checked the accuracy of the matching by means of a double-blinded coding of the content of newspaper articles and the date of the action described in online press releases. This matching procedure between protest events in the two sources of data allowed measuring media attention by counting far-right protest events promoted via online press releases *and* subsequently covered in newspaper articles. The full coding list with detailed definition of each variable will be released upon completion of the research project, and is available upon request.

Our coding procedure produced three types of protest events: 1) events that feature online but do not receive newspapers coverage (coded as 0); 2) events that feature online and receive media coverage (coded as 1); and events that are covered in newspapers, but not in online press-releases (excluded from the analysis). The latter are protests that involve far-right actors but that are not explicitly endorsed by them. Lacking information about the input for earned media coverage, we excluded this type of events for this study. Table A provides descriptive figures for protest events in newspapers and online press releases for the 11 countries under study.

Table A. Protest events in newspapers and online press releases (2008-2018)

Country	Nr of events	Press releases	Newspapers	Press releases & newspapers	Press releases only	Newspaper only
France	716	434	282	68	366	214
Italy	1500	1076	424	59	1017	365
UK	227	117	110	33	84	77
Austria	112	83	29	12	71	17
Bulgaria	367	258	109	45	213	64
Estonia	141	70	71	46	24	25
Germany	629	223	406	36	187	370
Greece	648	442	206	13	429	193
Poland	873	567	306	66	501	240
Slovakia	342	253	89	61	192	28
Sweden	417	271	146	41	230	105
Tot	**5972**	**3794**	**2178**	**480**	**3314**	**1698**

Table A1. Main group, newspapers and websites used for data collection

Country	Main group	Newspaper	Website
Austria	Identitäre Bewegung	*Die Presse*	https://www.identitaere-bewegung.at
Bulgaria	VMRO	*Dnevnik*	http://www.vmro.bg/
Estonia	EKRE	*Postimees*	www.ekre.ee
France	Les identitaires	*Le Monde*	www.les-identitaires.com; www.generation-identitaire.com; www.bloc-identitaire.com
Germany	PEGIDA NPD	*Süddeutsche Zeitung*	https://www.facebook.com/pegidaevofficial www.npd.de
Greece	Golden Dawn	*Kathimerini*	www.xryshaygh.com
Italy	CasaPound Italia	*Il Corriere della Sera*	www.casapounditalia.org/
Poland	Ruch Narodowy Mlodziez Wszechpolska Oboz Norodowo-Radykalny	*Gazeta Wyborcza*	https://ruchnarodowy.net https://mw.org.pl https://www.onr.com.pl
Slovakia	Kotleba – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko	*SME*	http://www.naseslovensko.net
Sweden	Sverigedemokraterna Nordiska motståndsrörelsen	*Dagens Nyheter*	www.sd.se www.nordfront.se
United Kingdom	English Defence League Britain First	*The Guardian*	http://www.englishdefenceleague.org.uk https://www.britainfirst.org

For the selection of media sources, we opted for the printed press because the comparative design covering eleven European countries made accessibility a primary concern, and thus the national press preferable to other sources such as agency dispatches and police reports (Hutter 2014). Since we wanted to employ sources that were as comparable as possible, we opted for one quality newspaper per country. Following previous examples, we chose the main liberal outlet in each country: these outlets are considered particularly suited for comparative studies because they mirror the debates in a detailed manner and influence the editorial decisions of a wide range of other news organisations (Kriesi et al. 2020). To test for a possible reliability bias due to the political leanings and journalistic practices of the selected news sources, we used the FACTIVA archives to compare the number of relevant articles in our target outlets with the ones of other mainstream quality newspapers in each country. Specifically, we controlled for whether the same list of keywords used in our study would yield significantly different findings if applied to other quality newspapers. For a subsample of countries for which additional news sources were available in the web archive, we compared the overall number of articles produced by the keywords applied to two alternative quality newspapers. Table A2 reports the results for a sample period of 12 months (May 2019-May2020), which show that while different quality newspapers might have diverging political leaning, this does not affect substantially the visibility of far-right actors, at least in terms of mentions.

Since multiple researchers were involved in the coding, we ran reliability tests to check for inter-coder consistency (Berkhout et al. 2015). To test for selection bias, we asked coders to select the relevant articles/press releases within a broader sample whereby we included a number of false positives. To test for description bias, we then asked coders to code the relevant articles for the 23 variables included in the dataset. These tests yielded a strong consistency regarding both the selection/identification of events and their description. The Cronbach alpha for selection bias (computed on a sample of 15 articles and 10 web posts) was 0.985. The

Cronbach alphas for description bias (computed on a sample of ten articles) were 0.998, 0.995, 0.992, 0.879, and 0.987, with an average of 0.970.

Table A2. Media coverage of far-right groups in different newspapers

Name of group	Newspaper 1	Nr	Newspaper 2	Nr	% Diff
CasaPound Italia	*La Repubblica*	188	*Corriere della Sera*	240	12
EDL	*The Guardian*	48	*The Times*	47	1
Britain First	*The Guardian*	46	*The Times*	49	3
Les Identitaires	*Le Monde*	60	*Le Figaro*	71	8
PEGIDA	*Süddeutsche Zeitung*	163	*Die Zeit*	135	9
NPD	*Süddeutsche Zeitung*	167	*Die Zeit*	120	16
Identitäre	*Die Presse*	10	*Der Kurier*	14	16
Ruch Narodowy	*Gazeta Wyborzca*	87	*Fakt*	73	9
EKRE	*Postimees*	90	*DELFI*	74	9
BMPO	*Dnevnik*	554	24 Chasa	632	7

Comparison with existing protest event data

While no existing dataset focuses specifically on the far right, the archive by the Observatory for Political Conflict and Democracy (PolDem) allows for a comparison on a subset of the data, as it houses a large stock of comparative data on protest events and issue-specific public contestation covering a wide range of European countries over a long period of time. We focus on the poldem-protest_30 dataset (Kriesi et al. 2020a), which stores protest events in 30 European countries over the period 2000-2015. Since the dataset covers all issues of protest and does not include a variable for far-right collective actors, we selected protest events coded as 'xenophobic', and then excluded those that were promoted by mainstream political actors. From our data, we excluded all protest events derived from far-right collective actors' websites, limiting the comparison to newspapers data only. While we assume that this offers good grounds for comparison with far-right protest mobilisation, important differences exist between the two datasets, notably concerning the source of data (English language news wires vs. national quality newspapers), sampling strategy, and the string used to extract the data (general string vs. actor-centered string using organisation names).

Table A3 and Figure A1 below illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of the respective designs, showing that the two data collection strategies produce slightly dissimilar data, notably with respect to countries like Germany and Italy. Our goal is not to assess which strategy performs best, but we believe that these divergences can be explained by the sampling technique adopted in the PolDem dataset, and the actor-based approach used in our own. A closer look at the data shows that, if our approach certainly reduces the bias of sampling over the total amount of protests reported, it underestimates the weight of spontaneous protests that could not be attributed to any specific actors (as confirmed by the large share of xenophobic protest events which did not have a 'sponsoring' actor in the PolDem dataset).

Table A3. Protest events by country (PolDem data vs. FARPE data, newspapers only)

	POLDEM Data		[Omitted] Data	
	nr of protests	%	nr of protests	%
Bulgaria	37	3,94	68	3,39
Estonia	3	0,32	44	2,19
France	137	14,62	151	7,53
Germany	290	30,95	315	15,70
Greece	79	8,43	187	9,32
Hungary	44	4,7	201	10,02
Italy	64	6,83	601	29,96
Poland	29	3,09	167	8,33
Slovakia	85	9,07	58	2,89
Sweden	62	6,62	120	5,98
UK	107	11,42	94	4,69
Tot.	937	100	2006	100

Figure A1. Share of far-right initiated protest events over total protests in PolDem data



Figure A2. Cross-country and overtime distribution of protest events, PolDem data (left) and FARPE data (right)





Annex B. Descriptive statistics

Table B1. Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables

Variable	Acronym	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Media coverage	*mediahit1*	3794	0.12	0.33	0.00	1.00
Representation	*MP*	3794	0.24	0.42	0.00	1.00
Actor type	*actortype*	3794	0.17	0.46	1.00	2.00
Issue focus: immigration	*immigration*	3794	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
Issue focus: europe	*europe*	3794	0.29	0.16	0.00	1.00
Issue focus: economy	*economy*	3794	0.17	0.38	0.00	1.00
Issue focus: law & order	*lawandorder*	3794	0.50	0.21	0.00	1.00
Issue focus: civil rights	*civilrights*	3794	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00
Size	*size*	3794	1.99	1.25	1.00	4.00
Repertoire: non contentious	*repertoire3*	3794	0.36	0.84	0.00	1.00
Repertoire: moderately cont.	*repertoire3*	3794	0.37	0.85	0.00	1.00
Repertoire: highly cont.	*repertoire3*	3794	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
Verbal countermobilization	*ctrmob*	3794	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Physical countermob.	*ctrmob*	3794	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
Organization age	*orgage*	3794	11.44	8.87	0.00	33.00
Election year	*electionyear*	3794	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
Vote share PRRPs	*voterrpp*	3794	9.55	4.55	0.00	26.00
Yearly inflow of migrants	*miginflow*	3794	253.03	327.57	0.11	2016.01
Yearly inflow of refugees	*refugees*	3794	60.15	87.81	0.12	587.31
Migration MIP	*migmip*	3794	11.62	9.73	0.00	45.00
Mobilization frequency	*mobfreq6*	3794	59.01	46.24	1.00	144.00

Main group	Country	Ideology	Year of Foundation	Organisation Type	MPs or EMPs
Identitäre Bewegung	Austria	Radical right	2012	Formal social movement	-
VMRO	Bulgaria	Radical right	1999	Political party	2008 and 2014-2018
EKRE	Estonia	Radical right	2006	Political party	2008-2010; 2015-2018
Les Identitaires	France	Radical right	2003	Formal social movement	-
PEGIDA	Germany	Radical right	2014	Formal social movement	-
NPD	Germany	Extreme right	1964	Political party	2014-2018
Golden Dawn	Greece	Extreme right	1985	Political party	2012-2018
CasaPound Italia	Italy	Extreme right	2003	Formal social movement	-
Ruch Narodowy	Poland	Extreme right	2008	Formal social movement	2015-2018
Kotleba – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko	Slovakia	Extreme right	1995	Political party	2016-2018
Sverigedemokraterna	Sweden	Radical right	1998	Political party	2009-2018
Nordiska Motståndsrörelsen	Sweden	Extreme right	1997	Formal social movement	-
English Defence League	United Kingdom	Radical right	2009	Formal social movement	-
Britain First	United Kingdom	Radical right	2011	Formal social movement	-

Figure B1. Yearly number of far-right protest events in online press releases and newspapers, by country (2008-2018)



Annex C. Model specification and robustness checks

Because the dependent variable is a dummy, the multivariate analysis rests on logistic regressions, using characteristics of protest events in the online press releases (organizational and strategic factors, detailed below) as predictors of subsequent media coverage. Model specification and goodness of fit test statistics confirm that this is the appropriate choice. To account for specification errors, we ran the Stata command linktest to our full model (including dummy for east and west europe), which confirms that the logit function as the link function is the correct choice for our analysis, that we have included all the relevant variables, and that the relationship between the logit of outcome variable and the independent variables is linear. The results indicated that the model is not misspecified, that we did not omit relevant variables and that our link function is correctly specified.

Table C1. Model specification error test

Logistic regression — Number of obs = 3,794; LR chi2(2) = 375.09; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -1253.0706; Pseudo R2 = 0.1302

mediahit1	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_hat	.7106342	.1594266	4.46	0.000	.3981637	1.023105
_hatsq	-.0887934	.0464643	-1.91	0.056	-.1798618	.0022751
_cons	-.1636445	.1351586	-1.21	0.226	-.4285505	.1012615

To evaluate model fit, we computed goodness-of-fit statistics via several pseudo R-squareds ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating better model fit (we excluded Hosmer and Lemeshow's goodness-of-fit test as under large sample sizes, this test tends to reject models that deviate only slightly from the true model). All of the pseudo R-squareds reported below agree that the full model better fits the outcome data than the baseline model.

Table C2. Goodness of fit test

	Current	Saved	Difference
Log-likelihood			
Model	-1257.023	-1362.032	105.010
Intercept-only	-1440.615	-1440.615	0.000
Chi-square			
D(df=3771/3784/-13)	2514.046	2724.065	-210.019
LR(df=22/9/13)	367.185	157.166	210.019
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000
R2			
McFadden	0.127	0.055	0.073
McFadden(adjusted)	0.111	0.048	0.064
McKelvey & Zavoina	0.214	0.112	0.102
Cox-Snell/ML	0.092	0.041	0.052
Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke	0.173	0.076	0.097
Efron	0.106	0.040	0.066
Tjur's D	0.111	0.041	0.070
Count	0.875	0.873	0.001
Count(adjusted)	0.010	0.000	0.010
IC			
AIC	2560.046	2744.065	-184.019
AIC divided by N	0.675	0.723	-0.049
BIC(df=23/10/13)	2703.593	2806.477	-102.884
Variance of			
e	3.290	3.290	0.000
y-star	4.185	3.706	0.479

We also tested for multicollinearity between two or more of the independent variables in the model, using the tolerane and VIF (variance inflation factor of the standard error) measures of the strength of the interrelationships among the variables. Our output shows that no variable is very closely related to another variable(s), as the tolerance level is not close to 0, and the variance inflation of all variables is not very large.

Table C3. Collinearity diagnostics

Collinearity Diagnostics

Variable	VIF	SQRT VIF	Tolerance	R-Squared
MP	2.24	1.50	0.4472	0.5528
orgage	3.62	1.90	0.2765	0.7235
C_yyyy	2.75	1.66	0.3641	0.6359
electionyear	1.11	1.05	0.9027	0.0973
voterrpp	1.79	1.34	0.5578	0.4422
miginflow	11.16	3.34	0.0896	0.9104
migmip	2.58	1.61	0.3877	0.6123
refugees	8.70	2.95	0.1149	0.8851
mobfreq6	1.97	1.40	0.5072	0.4928
actortype	1.77	1.33	0.5649	0.4351
immigration	1.27	1.13	0.7886	0.2114
europe	1.08	1.04	0.9259	0.0741
lawandorder	1.06	1.03	0.9423	0.0577
civilrights	1.14	1.07	0.8768	0.1232
economy	1.25	1.12	0.7979	0.2021
scope	1.25	1.12	0.8018	0.1982
repertoire3	1.10	1.05	0.9099	0.0901
ctrmob	1.32	1.15	0.7556	0.2444
NSWE	3.12	1.77	0.3202	0.6798
mediasyst	2.16	1.47	0.4635	0.5365
Mean VIF	2.62			

	Eigenval	Cond Index
1	9.9529	1.0000
2	1.6595	2.4490
3	1.4637	2.6077
4	1.1117	2.9921
5	1.0492	3.0800
6	0.9928	3.1662
7	0.9679	3.2067
8	0.7393	3.6692
9	0.6934	3.7886
10	0.5636	4.2024
11	0.5241	4.3576
12	0.3947	5.0218
13	0.2309	6.5660
14	0.1417	8.3810
15	0.1331	8.6474
16	0.1127	9.3986
17	0.1029	9.8367
18	0.0742	11.5810
19	0.0486	14.3138
20	0.0357	16.7008
21	0.0077	35.9781

Condition Number 35.9781
Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
Det(correlation matrix) 0.0007

To detect potential observations with a significant impact on the model, we calculated Pearson residuals as the standardized difference between the observed frequency and the predicted frequency. The measure of the relative deviations between the observed and fitted values shows that there are no cases with large Pearson residual values that need to be excluded from the regression (displayed in figure C1).

Figure C1. Standardised Paerson residuals by predicted probability



Deviance residuals measure the disagreement between the maxima of the observed and the fitted log likelihood functions. Since logistic regression uses the maximal likelihood principle, the goal in logistic regression is to minimize the sum of the deviance residuals.

Figure C2. Deviance residuals by predicted probability



The comparison of the logistic model with observations with large deviance residual values, and the model without it shows that the impact on our regression coefficient estimates and significance levels is negligible.

Table C4. Logistic regression excluding observations with high deviance residual

Logistic regression — Number of obs = 3,752; LR chi2(22) = 382.20; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -1191.0903; Pseudo R2 = 0.1383

mediahit1	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
MP	-.0054223	.1679494	-0.03	0.974	-.334597	.3237524
orgage	-.035698	.0121313	-2.94	0.003	-.0594749	-.011921
C_yyyy	-.0460729	.0256068	-1.80	0.072	-.0962612	.0041154
electionyear	.0554867	.1272255	0.44	0.663	-.1938707	.3048441
voterrpp	-.0036609	.0144177	-0.25	0.800	-.031919	.0245973
miginflow	-.0009482	.0005333	-1.78	0.075	-.0019935	.000097
migmip	.0124016	.0082192	1.51	0.131	-.0037077	.028511
refugees	.0040139	.001734	2.31	0.021	.0006153	.0074124
mobfreq6	.0003083	.0023216	0.13	0.894	-.0042419	.0048585
actortype						
Formal Social Movement Orgs	-.2826899	.1562979	-1.81	0.071	-.5890281	.0236483
Informal groups & other	-.2953936	.3033996	-0.97	0.330	-.8900458	.2992586
immigration	.2626715	.1542129	1.70	0.089	-.0395803	.5649232
europe	.4422386	.2707883	1.63	0.102	-.0884967	.972974
lawandorder	.2995809	.2537922	1.18	0.238	-.1978427	.7970045
civilrights	-.2511055	.2283119	-1.10	0.271	-.6985886	.1963776
economy	.2151592	.1818715	1.18	0.237	-.1413023	.5716207
scope	.5334589	.0970483	5.50	0.000	.3432477	.7236701
repertoire3						
marches	.8522263	.1638655	5.20	0.000	.5310558	1.173397
confrontation	.8880319	.1656418	5.36	0.000	.5633799	1.212684
1.ctrmob	1.42183	.1571861	9.05	0.000	1.113751	1.729909
NSWE						
2	-.386977	.2754098	-1.41	0.160	-.9267704	.1528163
3	.4111064	.2308949	1.78	0.075	-.0414394	.8636521
_cons	-3.395563	.4192732	-8.10	0.000	-4.217323	-2.573803

Figure C3. Pregibon leverage values by predicted probability



Table C5. Logistic regression excluding observations with high leverage value

```
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -1232.2793

Logistic regression                                     Number of obs =  3,735
                                                        LR chi2(22)   = 365.93
                                                        Prob > chi2   = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -1232.2793                             Pseudo R2     = 0.1293

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             mediahit1 | Coefficient  Std. err.      z    P>|z|     [95% conf. interval]
-----------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------
                    MP |   .0006901    .163548     0.00   0.997    -.3198581    .3212382
               orgage |  -.0366819   .0122345    -3.00   0.003    -.0606611   -.0127027
               C_yyyy |  -.0552088   .0255981    -2.16   0.031    -.1053801   -.0050375
         electionyear |   .1880288   .1223376     1.54   0.124    -.0517485    .4278061
             voterrpp |   .0061584   .0141903     0.43   0.664    -.0216542    .0339709
            miginflow |  -.0006306    .000544    -1.16   0.246    -.0016969    .0004358
               migmip |   .0041575   .0081736     0.51   0.611    -.0118625    .0201774
             refugees |   .0030539   .0017282     1.77   0.077    -.0003333    .0064411
             mobfreq6 |   .0022792   .0022642     1.01   0.314    -.0021586     .006717
                      |
              actortype |
Formal Social Movement Orgs |  -.3967671   .1514365    -2.62   0.009    -.6935771    -.099957
    Informal groups & other |  -.4880039   .3145755    -1.55   0.121    -1.104561    .1285527
                      |
           immigration |   .4000694   .1478392     2.71   0.007       .11031    .6898289
                europe |   .4249695   .2850509     1.49   0.136    -.1337199     .983659
           lawandorder |   .3845728   .2623724     1.47   0.143    -.1296677    .8988133
           civilrights |  -.0993237   .2148404    -0.46   0.644    -.5204033    .3217558
               economy |   .2211936   .1808707     1.22   0.221    -.1333066    .5756937
                 scope |   .4566191   .0962513     4.74   0.000       .26797    .6452682
                      |
           repertoire3 |
              marches |   .7838137   .1558883     5.03   0.000     .4782783    1.089349
        confrontation |   .8001426   .1579735     5.07   0.000     .4905202    1.109765
                      |
             1.ctrmob |   1.334977   .1546031     8.63   0.000      1.03196    1.637993
                      |
                 NSWE |
                   2 |  -.7502049   .2695384    -2.78   0.005    -1.278491   -.2219192
                   3 |   .2727787   .2251635     1.21   0.226    -.1685337    .7140911
                      |
                _cons |  -3.09325   .4189813    -7.38   0.000    -3.914438   -2.272062
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

To further assess model specification, notably with respect to possible omitted variables measuring visibility as a function of protest size and duration, we ran all the models by adding a variable measuring Google Trends visibility enjoyed by each far-right collective actor included in the study (per year and country) over the observed period (for a similar strategy, see Andretta & Pavan, 2018). Building on Mellon (2013), we use Google Trends data to capture the visibility of far-right actors. In this interpretation, Google Trends data are more 'expressive' than 'informative' of users' behaviour as users do not necessarily aim to express interest in a political actor, but to find information. This notwithstanding, information-seeking behaviour can also be a precondition for interest.

We also tested for additional confounding or omitted variables, notably the type of countermobilization faced by far-right actors, and the possible effect of the refugee crisis in 2015. The results in tables C6a, C6b and C6c show no major divergence compared to the main models included in the paper.

Table C6. Main logistic regression including item for Google Trends visibility

Log likelihood = -1166.6754 Pseudo R2 = 0.1444

mediahit1	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
MP	.1957442	.1703228	1.15	0.250	-.1380824	.5295708
orgage	-.0775843	.0148498	-5.22	0.000	-.1066894	-.0484792
C_yyyy	-.0723172	.0271992	-2.66	0.008	-.1256267	-.0190077
electionyear	.0483991	.1304093	0.37	0.711	-.2071985	.3039967
voterrpp	.0046453	.0150027	0.31	0.757	-.0247594	.03405
miginflow	-.0021689	.000618	-3.51	0.000	-.0033802	-.0009577
migmip	.0206399	.0088457	2.33	0.020	.0033025	.0379772
refugees	.0056047	.0018071	3.10	0.002	.002063	.0091465
mobfreq6	.0028398	.0031147	0.91	0.362	-.0032649	.0089445
actortype						
Formal Social Movement Orgs	-.4001081	.1557391	-2.57	0.010	-.7053512	-.094865
Informal groups & other	-.5722554	.3077553	-1.86	0.063	-1.175445	.0309339
immigration	.64524	.1575802	4.09	0.000	.3363886	.9540914
europe	.4206202	.276476	1.52	0.128	-.1212629	.9625032
lawandorder	.1825719	.2654763	0.69	0.492	-.3377522	.702896
civilrights	.0417461	.2153229	0.19	0.846	-.3802791	.4637712
economy	.2117022	.1859124	1.14	0.255	-.1526793	.5760838
scope	.4068493	.1021053	3.98	0.000	.2067266	.606972
repertoire3						
marches	.8652792	.1626655	5.32	0.000	.5464607	1.184098
confrontation	.8914944	.1658945	5.37	0.000	.5663473	1.216642
1.ctrmob	1.179129	.1649703	7.15	0.000	.855793	1.502465
NSWE						
Southern Europe	-.9677346	.3537532	-2.74	0.006	-1.661078	-.2743911
Central Eastern Europe	-.2763604	.240197	-1.15	0.250	-.7471379	.1944171
res_exposure	.0054115	.0064052	0.84	0.398	-.0071424	.0179654
_cons	-2.353987	.4451642	-5.29	0.000	-3.226492	-1.481481

Table C6a. Main logistic regression distinguishing type of counter-mobilization

Logistic regression — Number of obs = 3,637; LR chi2(24) = 459.12; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -1135.6368; Pseudo R2 = 0.1682

mediahit1	Odds ratio	Std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
actortype	.8228445	.1173059	-1.37	0.171	.6222562	1.088094
MP	.8282867	.1494715	-1.04	0.296	.5815325	1.179743
immigration	1.585841	.2516104	2.91	0.004	1.162004	2.164272
europe	1.521444	.483182	1.32	0.186	.816451	2.835186
economy	1.008253	.1886312	0.04	0.965	.6987481	1.454851
lawandorder	1.285174	.3338988	0.97	0.334	.7723472	2.138509
civilrights	.9680284	.2203451	-0.14	0.886	.6196344	1.51231
size	1.383469	.0649129	6.92	0.000	1.261917	1.516729
repertoire3						
marches	2.579218	.4118312	5.93	0.000	1.886142	3.526971
confrontation	2.277329	.3729617	5.03	0.000	1.65205	3.139268
1.ctrmob	5.131097	.9674051	8.67	0.000	3.545902	7.424954
verbal	10.34785	3.740986	6.46	0.000	5.094734	21.01741
orgage	.9784914	.0127575	-1.67	0.095	.953804	1.003818
C_yyyy	.9521174	.024402	-1.91	0.056	.9054718	1.001166
electionyear	1.196631	.1565242	1.37	0.170	.9260183	1.546325
voterrpp	1.02919	.0156178	1.90	0.058	.9990301	1.06026
miginflow	1.001105	.0006183	1.79	0.074	.9998944	1.002318
refugees	.9980655	.0022019	-0.88	0.380	.9937591	1.002391
migmip	1.017408	.0095498	1.84	0.066	.9988615	1.036298
mobfreq6	.996777	.0018996	-1.69	0.090	.9930608	1.000507
mediasyst						
Democratic corporatist model	.5884651	.1621087	-1.92	0.054	.3429527	1.009735
Liberal model	.3958407	.1554971	-2.36	0.018	.1832926	.8548617
Northern CEE model	4.091937	.9837999	5.86	0.000	2.554345	6.555083
Eastern CEE model	1.559615	.4011105	1.73	0.084	.9421077	2.581869
_cons	.0239601	.010353	-8.64	0.000	.0102728	.0558841

Note: **_cons** estimates baseline odds.

.
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Table C6b. Main logistic regression before 2015 (refugee crisis effect)

Logistic regression — Number of obs = 2,328; LR chi2(23) = 297.11; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -747.83004; Pseudo R2 = 0.1657

mediahit1	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
actortype	-.4226352	.2288155	-1.85	0.065	-.8711053	.0258349
MP	-.474642	.3270181	-1.45	0.147	-1.115586	.1663017
immigration	.4595395	.2080991	2.21	0.027	.0516728	.8674061
europe	.6772393	.3031071	2.23	0.025	.0831602	1.271318
economy	.1128488	.2044979	0.55	0.581	-.2879598	.5136573
lawandorder	.4693983	.303498	1.55	0.122	-.1254469	1.064244
civilrights	-.1356182	.335455	-0.40	0.686	-.793098	.5218616
scope	.6293042	.1578553	3.99	0.000	.3199136	.9386948
repertoire3						
marches	.9986095	.1948534	5.12	0.000	.6167038	1.380515
confrontation	.8951197	.1966517	4.55	0.000	.5096895	1.28055
1.ctrmob	1.137684	.2822118	4.03	0.000	.5845593	1.690809
orgage	-.035461	.0283595	-1.25	0.211	-.0910446	.0201227
C_yyyy	.0301805	.0436783	0.69	0.490	-.0554275	.1157885
electionyear	.2833545	.174296	1.63	0.104	-.0582593	.6249683
voterrpp	.0468032	.0184585	2.54	0.011	.0106252	.0829812
miginflow	.000891	.0011357	0.78	0.433	-.001335	.0031169
refugees	.0008727	.0054472	0.16	0.873	-.0098037	.0115491
migmip	.0265045	.0150736	1.76	0.079	-.0030391	.0560481
mobfreq6	-.0069289	.0024447	-2.83	0.005	-.0117204	-.0021375
mediasyst						
Democratic corporatist model	.1077541	.4953463	0.22	0.828	-.8631068	1.078615
Liberal model	-.4603	.6076038	-0.76	0.449	-1.651182	.7305815
Northern CEE model	1.015348	.3570385	2.84	0.004	.3155651	1.71513
Eastern CEE model	.1705389	.3337705	0.51	0.609	-.4836392	.8247169
_cons	-3.275358	.6586885	-4.97	0.000	-4.566364	-1.984353

Table C6c. Main logistic regression before 2015 (refugee crisis effect)

Logistic regression — Number of obs = 1,466; LR chi2(23) = 220.34; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -433.84944; Pseudo R2 = 0.2025

mediahit1	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
actortype	.4519089	.2743057	1.65	0.099	-.0857205	.9895382
MP	.3763035	.2294939	1.64	0.101	-.0734962	.8261033
immigration	.3128454	.2468245	1.27	0.205	-.1709218	.7966126
europe	-1.950564	.8185003	-2.38	0.017	-3.554795	-.346333
economy	.1354203	.5135509	0.26	0.792	-.8711211	1.141962
lawandorder	-.2948731	.5618129	-0.52	0.600	-1.396006	.80626
civilrights	.1888026	.3108709	0.61	0.544	-.4204932	.7980983
scope	.688453	.2460858	2.80	0.005	.2061338	1.170772
repertoire3						
marches	.5363861	.2925833	1.83	0.067	-.0370666	1.109839
confrontation	.5307707	.3199463	1.66	0.097	-.0963125	1.157854
1.ctrmob	1.627627	.2395824	6.79	0.000	1.158054	2.0972
orgage	-.0692865	.0185982	-3.73	0.000	-.1057383	-.0328347
C_yyyy	.0825873	.1134767	0.73	0.467	-.1398229	.3049976
electionyear	.3127243	.2718742	1.15	0.250	-.2201393	.8455878
voterrpp	-.1398279	.040178	-3.48	0.001	-.2185754	-.0610804
miginflow	-.0010999	.0012792	-0.86	0.390	-.0036071	.0014074
refugees	.0013037	.0047461	0.27	0.784	-.0079985	.010606
migmip	.0768143	.0271654	2.83	0.005	.023571	.1300575
mobfreq6	.0118333	.0063899	1.85	0.064	-.0006908	.0243574
mediasyst						
Democratic corporatist model	-.5140856	.5766818	-0.89	0.373	-1.644361	.61619
Liberal model	-1.714424	.8909318	-1.92	0.054	-3.460618	.03177
Northern CEE model	1.863233	.4892539	3.81	0.000	.9043125	2.822153
Eastern CEE model	-.1148338	.754381	-0.15	0.879	-1.593393	1.363726
_cons	-4.25345	1.042492	-4.08	0.000	-6.296696	-2.210204

Table C6d. Protest Initiators Model distinguishing extreme and radical right groups

Logistic regression — Number of obs = 3,650; LR chi2(16) = 241.33; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -1277.2379; Pseudo R2 = 0.0863

mediahit1	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
actortype	.1612918	.1295275	1.25	0.213	-.0925774	.415161
MP	.0099781	.1738	0.06	0.954	-.3306636	.3506197
radext	.0999798	.1464696	0.68	0.495	-.1870953	.387055
electionyear	.0768426	.1199272	0.64	0.522	-.1582104	.3118955
voterrpp	-.0116558	.01466	-0.80	0.427	-.0403889	.0170772
pos_consensus	-.2533402	.0868684	-2.92	0.004	-.4235992	-.0830812
miginflow	.0003959	.0005478	0.72	0.470	-.0006779	.0014696
refugees	-.0037295	.0020637	-1.81	0.071	-.0077742	.0003152
migmip	.0210335	.0089205	2.36	0.018	.0035496	.0385174
dos_ban	-.7749603	.2623002	-2.95	0.003	-1.289059	-.2608613
mediasyst						
Democratic corporatist model	.5372208	.2443446	2.20	0.028	.0583143	1.016127
Liberal model	.2164842	.3540978	0.61	0.541	-.4775348	.9105031
Northern CEE model	.5955229	.2189881	2.72	0.007	.1663141	1.024732
C_yyyy	-.0081915	.0239875	-0.34	0.733	-.0552061	.0388231
orgage	-.0590224	.0145503	-4.06	0.000	-.0875405	-.0305042
mobfreq6	-.0073016	.0020684	-3.53	0.000	-.0113555	-.0032477
_cons	-1.03515	.4974975	-2.08	0.037	-2.010228	-.0600732

Finally, to assess the impact of the unequal distribution of observations across country cases on our regression coefficient estimates, we compared the results for the logistic regression by systematically excluding country cases displaying very high (Italy) or very low numbers of events (Austria), and checked robustness excluding cases in Western (UK) and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria). The results show that the impact is limited and that there is no change in the significance levels of our main predictors.

Table C7a Logistic regression stepwise exclusion of country cases: Bulgaria

Logistic regression — Number of obs = 3,536; LR chi2(22) = 359.63; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -1138.757; Pseudo R2 = 0.1364

mediahit1	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
MP	.1515161	.1826052	0.83	0.407	-.2063836	.5094158
orgage	-.0385467	.0133862	-2.88	0.004	-.0647832	-.0123102
C_yyyy	-.054919	.0286773	-1.92	0.055	-.1111254	.0012875
electionyear	.0460415	.1322523	0.35	0.728	-.2131684	.3052513
voterrpp	.0160205	.0140839	1.14	0.255	-.0115834	.0436245
miginflow	-.0006822	.0005326	-1.28	0.200	-.0017261	.0003617
migmip	-.005736	.0098762	-0.58	0.561	-.0250929	.0136209
refugees	.0036417	.0017635	2.07	0.039	.0001854	.0070981
mobfreq6	-.0008691	.0023398	-0.37	0.710	-.005455	.0037168
actortype						
Formal Social Movement Orgs	-.3536632	.1608045	-2.20	0.028	-.6688343	-.0384921
Informal groups & other	-.4184687	.3086863	-1.36	0.175	-1.023483	.1865453
immigration	.3481986	.1480764	2.35	0.019	.0579743	.638423
europe	.3686248	.2762731	1.33	0.182	-.1728605	.9101101
lawandorder	.0163971	.266754	0.06	0.951	-.5064311	.5392254
civilrights	-.3549465	.2352694	-1.51	0.131	-.8160661	.1061731
economy	.0972511	.2138481	0.45	0.649	-.3218835	.5163856
scope	.428875	.0994368	4.31	0.000	.2339824	.6237675
repertoire3						
marches	.792749	.1604588	4.94	0.000	.4782556	1.107242
confrontation	.8711728	.1635484	5.33	0.000	.5506238	1.191722
1.ctrmob	1.339658	.1611082	8.32	0.000	1.023892	1.655424
NSWE						
2	-.5738537	.2695925	-2.13	0.033	-1.102245	-.0454621
3	.3041804	.2550135	1.19	0.233	-.1956369	.8039977
_cons	-2.863423	.4441085	-6.45	0.000	-3.73386	-1.992987

Table C7.b Logistic regression stepwise exclusion of country cases: Austria

Logistic regression — Number of obs = 3,711
LR chi2(22) = 375.22
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -1218.5891 — Pseudo R2 = 0.1334

mediahit1	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
MP	.0518985	.1647264	0.32	0.753	-.2709592	.3747563
orgage	-.0682022	.014855	-4.59	0.000	-.0973175	-.039087
C_yyyy	-.036666	.0259144	-1.41	0.157	-.0874573	.0141253
electionyear	.1405213	.1223285	1.15	0.251	-.0992382	.3802808
voterrpp	.0241627	.0148459	1.63	0.104	-.0049347	.05326
miginflow	-.0017518	.0006162	-2.84	0.004	-.0029596	-.000544
migmip	.0184357	.0087887	2.10	0.036	.0012102	.0356612
refugees	.0043393	.0017677	2.45	0.014	.0008747	.0078038
mobfreq6	.0008299	.0023017	0.36	0.718	-.0036813	.005341
actortype						
Formal Social Movement Orgs	-.4487297	.1522358	-2.95	0.003	-.7471065	-.150353
Informal groups & other	-.618811	.3032727	-2.04	0.041	-1.213214	-.0244074
immigration	.4764456	.1515329	3.14	0.002	.1794466	.7734446
europe	.4531302	.269775	1.68	0.093	-.0756191	.9818796
lawandorder	.205785	.2536548	0.81	0.417	-.2913693	.7029393
civilrights	-.0393417	.21549	-0.18	0.855	-.4616944	.383011
economy	.2383217	.1821352	1.31	0.191	-.1186568	.5953002
scope	.4373446	.1007298	4.34	0.000	.2399178	.6347713
repertoire3						
marches	.8928115	.1575932	5.67	0.000	.5839345	1.201689
confrontation	.8770254	.159242	5.51	0.000	.5649167	1.189134
1.ctrmob	1.292289	.1592946	8.11	0.000	.980077	1.6045
NSWE						
2	-.5961943	.2682847	-2.22	0.026	-1.122023	-.0703659
3	-.1025329	.2390531	-0.43	0.668	-.5710683	.3660024
_cons	-2.708705	.4258753	-6.36	0.000	-3.543406	-1.874005

Table C7c Logistic regression stepwise exclusion of country cases: UK

Logistic regression — Number of obs = 3,677; LR chi2(22) = 346.09; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -1187.5716; Pseudo R2 = 0.1272

mediahit1	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
MP	-.0526832	.1661124	-0.32	0.751	-.3782574	.272891
orgage	-.0402272	.0126652	-3.18	0.001	-.0650506	-.0154038
C_yyyy	-.0478768	.0302347	-1.58	0.113	-.1071357	.0113821
electionyear	.1100379	.128507	0.86	0.392	-.1418312	.361907
voterrpp	.0140404	.016563	0.85	0.397	-.0184223	.0465032
miginflow	-.0009144	.0005625	-1.63	0.104	-.0020168	.000188
migmip	-.0002295	.0088578	-0.03	0.979	-.0175905	.0171314
refugees	.0040238	.002124	1.89	0.058	-.0001392	.0081867
mobfreq6	.0013523	.002339	0.58	0.563	-.003232	.0059366
actortype						
Formal Social Movement Orgs	-.39082	.1550998	-2.52	0.012	-.69481	-.0868299
Informal groups & other	-.5212553	.3075422	-1.69	0.090	-1.124027	.0815163
immigration	.369509	.1521961	2.43	0.015	.0712101	.6678079
europe	.3592227	.2781622	1.29	0.197	-.1859652	.9044105
lawandorder	-.0334677	.2785841	-0.12	0.904	-.5794825	.5125471
civilrights	-.1460721	.2171526	-0.67	0.501	-.5716834	.2795393
economy	.1566721	.1804823	0.87	0.385	-.1970667	.5104108
scope	.4555401	.097378	4.68	0.000	.2646828	.6463974
repertoire3						
marches	.721304	.1573667	4.58	0.000	.4128708	1.029737
confrontation	.7557537	.1592886	4.74	0.000	.4435537	1.067954
1.ctrmob	1.438601	.1610502	8.93	0.000	1.122949	1.754254
NSWE						
2	-.6620918	.2705017	-2.45	0.014	-1.192265	-.1319182
3	.2212391	.2451586	0.90	0.367	-.2592629	.7017412
_cons	-2.925126	.4498347	-6.50	0.000	-3.806786	-2.043467

Table C7d Logistic regression stepwise exclusion of country cases: Italy

Logistic regression — Number of obs = 2,718; LR chi2(22) = 260.89; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -1041.2967; Pseudo R2 = 0.1113

mediahit1	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
MP	.0066927	.1668597	0.04	0.968	-.3203462	.3337316
orgage	-.0429914	.01263	-3.40	0.001	-.0677458	-.0182371
C_yyyy	-.0416823	.0284051	-1.47	0.142	-.0973553	.0139908
electionyear	.1705945	.1300723	1.31	0.190	-.0843425	.4255315
voterrpp	-.0022338	.0153794	-0.15	0.885	-.0323769	.0279092
miginflow	-.0015219	.000607	-2.51	0.012	-.0027116	-.0003321
migmip	.0023253	.0087826	0.26	0.791	-.0148883	.0195389
refugees	.005156	.0019448	2.65	0.008	.0013443	.0089677
mobfreq6	.0031689	.0025247	1.26	0.209	-.0017795	.0081173
actortype						
Formal Social Movement Orgs	-.5017923	.1533417	-3.27	0.001	-.8023364	-.2012482
Informal groups & other	-.5909979	.3011746	-1.96	0.050	-1.181289	-.0007065
immigration	.2764963	.1541013	1.79	0.073	-.0255366	.5785293
europe	.4561134	.2974574	1.53	0.125	-.1268924	1.039119
lawandorder	.3555804	.2658457	1.34	0.181	-.1654677	.8766284
civilrights	-.0472196	.2239792	-0.21	0.833	-.4862107	.3917715
economy	.23707	.2313471	1.02	0.305	-.2163621	.6905021
scope	.3025576	.1025172	2.95	0.003	.1016275	.5034877
repertoire3						
marches	.8055509	.1746946	4.61	0.000	.4631558	1.147946
confrontation	.6802075	.17717	3.84	0.000	.3329606	1.027454
1.ctrmob	1.39646	.1549672	9.01	0.000	1.092729	1.70019
NSWE						
2	-1.161966	.4006426	-2.90	0.004	-1.947211	-.3767213
3	.0041909	.2428688	0.02	0.986	-.4718232	.4802051
_cons	-2.385582	.4395117	-5.43	0.000	-3.24701	-1.524155

Table C7e Logistic regression stepwise exclusion of country cases: Germany

mediahit1	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
actortype	-.1535099	.1552334	-0.99	0.323	-.4577619	.1507421
MP	-.0888871	.1991093	-0.45	0.655	-.4791342	.30136
immigration	.5139794	.1742672	2.95	0.003	.1724219	.8555369
europe	.3243059	.3360399	0.97	0.335	-.3343203	.982932
economy	-.0760352	.1942141	-0.39	0.695	-.4566879	.3046174
lawandorder	.3841095	.288009	1.33	0.182	-.1803778	.9485968
civilrights	-.0157872	.2316929	-0.07	0.946	-.469897	.4383226
size						
Local demos in capital	-.1376084	.3008692	-0.46	0.647	-.7273013	.4520844
National demos outside capital	.4534689	.1946761	2.33	0.020	.0719107	.8350271
National demos in capital	1.050486	.1487705	7.06	0.000	.7589009	1.342071
repertoire3						
marches	.7149994	.1683155	4.25	0.000	.3851071	1.044892
confrontation	.6468984	.172949	3.74	0.000	.3079247	.9858722
1.ctrmob	1.63385	.2043715	7.99	0.000	1.233289	2.03441
electionyear	.2292306	.1404932	1.63	0.103	-.0461309	.5045922
voterrpp	.0096629	.0171143	0.56	0.572	-.0238805	.0432062
pos_consensus	-.0991583	.0971647	-1.02	0.307	-.2895975	.091281
miginflow	-.0008752	.0012174	-0.72	0.472	-.0032613	.0015109
refugees	.0040938	.0034282	1.19	0.232	-.0026255	.010813
migmip	.0263705	.0099601	2.65	0.008	.0068491	.045892
dos_ban	-.5623556	.2845728	-1.98	0.048	-1.120108	-.0046032
mediasyst						
Democratic corporatist model	-.5626652	.3330894	-1.69	0.091	-1.215508	.090178
Liberal model	-.7816658	.5830526	-1.34	0.180	-1.924428	.3610964
Northern CEE model	.3660574	.277544	1.32	0.187	-.1779188	.9100337
C_yyyy	-.0475207	.0301422	-1.58	0.115	-.1065984	.011557
orgage	-.0750079	.0155835	-4.81	0.000	-.105551	-.0444648
mobfreq6	-.0048399	.0026635	-1.82	0.069	-.0100602	.0003804
_cons	-1.872903	.5566361	-3.36	0.001	-2.96389	-.7819168

Annex E. Ethics assessment

DS_2021-07-02

SciencesPo

Opinion n° 2021-020

Research Ethics Committee of the Paris Institute of Political Studies (CDR)

Ethic opinion concerning the methodologies implemented in the MSCA IF project "FARMEC" led by Pietro Castelli

Having reviewed the MSCA IF project "Far-Right Mobilization and the European Crises: Electoral and Protest politics" research project and methodologies used by the Principal Investigator, Pietro Castelli, the Sciences Po Research Ethics Committee has assessed the project's compliance with ethics standards and procedures. It unanimously approves it.

Done in Paris

March 2nd of July 2021

Signature: Guillaume Plantin, President of the Sciences Po Research Ethics Committee (CDR), on behalf of all the CDR members

Annex F. STATA Logit Models Syntax

/// Main models

```
//baseline * mediasystems
logit mediahit1 electionyear voterrpp pos_consensus miginflow refugees migmip dos_ban C_yyyy
orgage mobfreq6
logit mediahit1 electionyear voterrpp pos_consensus miginflow refugees migmip dos_ban C_yyyy
orgage mobfreq6 , or

//baseline * mediasystems
logit mediahit1 electionyear voterrpp pos_consensus miginflow refugees migmip dos_ban i.mediasyst
C_yyyy orgage mobfreq6
logit mediahit1 electionyear voterrpp pos_consensus miginflow refugees migmip dos_ban i.mediasyst
C_yyyy orgage mobfreq6 , or

////baseline * coutnry dummies
logit mediahit1 electionyear voterrpp pos_consensus miginflow refugees migmip dos_ban ib4.cntry
C_yyyy orgage mobfreq6
logit mediahit1 electionyear voterrpp pos_consensus miginflow refugees migmip dos_ban ib4.cntry
C_yyyy orgage mobfreq6 , or

//initiators model
logit mediahit1 actortype MP electionyear voterrpp pos_consensus miginflow refugees migmip dos_ban
i.mediasyst C_yyyy orgage mobfreq6
logit mediahit1 actortype MP electionyear voterrpp pos_consensus miginflow refugees migmip dos_ban
i.mediasyst C_yyyy orgage mobfreq6, or

//PROTEST model
logit mediahit1 actortype MP immigration europe economy lawandorder civilrights i.size i.repertoire3
electionyear voterrpp pos_consensus miginflow refugees migmip dos_ban i.mediasyst C_yyyy orgage
mobfreq6
logit mediahit1 actortype MP immigration europe economy lawandorder civilrights i.size i.repertoire3
electionyear voterrpp pos_consensus miginflow refugees migmip dos_ban i.mediasyst C_yyyy orgage
mobfreq6, or


//full
logit mediahit1 actortype MP immigration europe economy lawandorder civilrights i.size i.repertoire3
i.ctrmob electionyear voterrpp pos_consensus miginflow refugees migmip dos_ban i.mediasyst C_yyyy
orgage mobfreq6

logit mediahit1 actortype MP immigration europe economy lawandorder civilrights i.size i.repertoire3
i.ctrmob electionyear voterrpp pos_consensus miginflow refugees migmip dos_ban i.mediasyst C_yyyy
orgage mobfreq6, or


//COEFPLOT
logit mediahit1 actortype MP immigration europe economy lawandorder civilrights i.size i.repertoire3
i.ctrmob electionyear voterrpp pos_consensus miginflow refugees migmip dos_ban i.mediasyst C_yyyy
orgage mobfreq6, or
estimates store fullmod
```

```
coefplot (fullmod, drop(_cons orgage C_yyyy mobfreq6) pstyle(p1line) msym(O) msize(small)
mcol(black) eform xline(1, lcolor(gs8))),  headings(actortype="{bf:Group characteristics}" immigration =
"{bf:Issue Focus}" 2.size="{bf:Protest scale}" 2.repertoire3="{bf:Tactics}" 1.ctrmob="{bf:Counter-
protest}" electionyear= "{bf:Political Opportunities}" miginflow= "{bf:Discursive Opportunities}"
2.mediasyst="{bf:Media system}") coeflabels(MP="Groups with MPs" actortype="Social movement org."
immigration="Immigration" europe="EU" economy="Economy and Welfare" lawandorder="Law &
Order" civilrights="Civil Rights"scope="National level" 2.repertoire3="Moderately contentious"
3.repertoire3="Highly contentious" 1.ctrmob="Street counter-mobilization" electionyear= "Electoral
year" voterrpp="Share of votes for RRPPs" pos_consensus="Institutional access points"
miginflow="Annual inflow of migrants" refugees="Annual inflow of refugees" migmip="MIP:
Immigration" dos_ban="Ban on far-right actors"4.mediasyst="CEE model", labsize(vsmall))  xtitle("Odds
ratios") xlabel(,labsize(small)) levels(95 5 1) cismooth(color(gs15))
legend(label("Full Model") rows(2))
```

Robustness checks

```
//* SPECIFICATION ERROR */
logit mediahit1 MP orgage C_yyyy electionyear voterrpp miginflow migmip refugees mobfreq6
i.actortype immigration europe lawandorder civilrights economy scope i.repertoire3 i.ctrmob i.NSWE,
nolog
linktest, nolog

//* GOODNESS OF FIT
collin MP orgage C_yyyy electionyear voterrpp miginflow migmip refugees mobfreq6 actortype
immigration europe lawandorder civilrights economy scope repertoire3 ctrmob NSWE mediasys

//* INFLUENTIAL OBSERVATIONS
//1// Pearson residuals
logit mediahit1 MP orgage C_yyyy electionyear voterrpp miginflow migmip refugees mobfreq6
i.actortype immigration europe lawandorder civilrights economy scope i.repertoire3 i.ctrmob NSWE
mediasys
predict p
predict stdres, rstand
scatter stdres p, mlab(id) ylab(-4(2) 16) yline(0)
gen id1=_n
/*scatter stdres id1, mlab(id) ylab(-4(2) 16) yline(0)*/

//2// Deviance residuals
logit mediahit1 MP orgage C_yyyy electionyear voterrpp miginflow migmip refugees mobfreq6
i.actortype immigration europe lawandorder civilrights economy scope i.repertoire3 i.ctrmob NSWE
mediasys
predict dv, dev
scatter dv p, mlab(id) mlabsize(vsmall) yline(0)
//scatter dv id1,  yline(0)

//Comparison
preserve
drop if dv>3.8
logit mediahit1 MP orgage C_yyyy electionyear voterrpp miginflow migmip refugees mobfreq6
i.actortype immigration europe lawandorder civilrights economy scope i.repertoire3 i.ctrmob i.NSWE
restore

//3// Pregibon leverage
```

```
logit mediahit1 MP orgage C_yyyy electionyear voterrpp miginflow migmip refugees mobfreq6 i.actortype immigration europe lawandorder civilrights economy scope i.repertoire3 i.ctrmob i.NSWE
predict hat, hat
scatter hat p, mlab(id) yline(0)
//scatter hat id1, mlab(id)

//Comparison
preserve
drop if hat>0.1
logit mediahit1 MP orgage C_yyyy electionyear voterrpp miginflow migmip refugees mobfreq6 i.actortype immigration europe lawandorder civilrights economy scope i.repertoire3 i.ctrmob i.NSWE
restore

//INFLUENTIAL OBSERVATIONS COUNTRY LEVEL//
//stepwise exclusion of coutnry cases
logit mediahit1 MP orgage C_yyyy electionyear voterrpp miginflow migmip refugees mobfreq6 i.actortype immigration europe lawandorder civilrights economy scope i.repertoire3 i.ctrmob i.NSWE if cntryid!=2

logit mediahit1 MP orgage C_yyyy electionyear voterrpp miginflow migmip refugees mobfreq6 i.actortype immigration europe lawandorder civilrights economy scope i.repertoire3 i.ctrmob i.NSWE  if cntryid!=1

logit mediahit1 MP orgage C_yyyy electionyear voterrpp miginflow migmip refugees mobfreq6 i.actortype immigration europe lawandorder civilrights economy scope i.repertoire3 i.ctrmob i.NSWE if cntryid!=10

logit mediahit1 MP orgage C_yyyy electionyear voterrpp miginflow migmip refugees mobfreq6 i.actortype immigration europe lawandorder civilrights economy scope i.repertoire3 i.ctrmob i.NSWE  if cntryid!=7 //ok

logit mediahit1 MP orgage C_yyyy electionyear voterrpp miginflow migmip refugees mobfreq6 i.actortype immigration europe lawandorder civilrights economy scope i.repertoire3 i.ctrmob i.NSWE  if cntryid!=11

//GOOGLE TRENDS//
gen res_exposure=.
gen year=yyyy
//Bulgaria
replace res_exposure=   39.3    if year==2008    & cntryid==2
replace res_exposure=   34.5    if year==2009    & cntryid==2
replace res_exposure=   35.9    if year==2010    & cntryid==2
replace res_exposure=   37.0    if year==2011    & cntryid==2
replace res_exposure=   21.9    if year==2012    & cntryid==2
replace res_exposure=   37.6    if year==2013    & cntryid==2
replace res_exposure=   27.3    if year==2014    & cntryid==2
replace res_exposure=   25.4    if year==2015    & cntryid==2
replace res_exposure=   17.0    if year==2016    & cntryid==2
replace res_exposure=   22.4    if year==2017    & cntryid==2
replace res_exposure=   16.2    if year==2018    & cntryid==2

//Estonia
replace res_exposure=   3.1     if year==2008    & cntryid==3
replace res_exposure=   18.1    if year==2009    & cntryid==3
replace res_exposure=   3.5     if year==2010    & cntryid==3
```

```
replace res_exposure=   15.0    if year==2011    & cntryid==3
replace res_exposure=   0.9     if year==2012    & cntryid==3
replace res_exposure=   4.0     if year==2013    & cntryid==3
replace res_exposure=   5.1     if year==2014    & cntryid==3
replace res_exposure=   31.7    if year==2015    & cntryid==3
replace res_exposure=   20.4    if year==2016    & cntryid==3
replace res_exposure=   27.1    if year==2017    & cntryid==3
replace res_exposure=   27.2    if year==2018    & cntryid==3

//France
replace res_exposure=   22.5    if year==2008    & cntryid==4
replace res_exposure=   21.8    if year==2009    & cntryid==4
replace res_exposure=   11.2    if year==2010    & cntryid==4
replace res_exposure=   14.7    if year==2011    & cntryid==4
replace res_exposure=   22.3    if year==2012    & cntryid==4
replace res_exposure=   15.8    if year==2013    & cntryid==4
replace res_exposure=   9.4     if year==2014    & cntryid==4
replace res_exposure=   11.7    if year==2015    & cntryid==4
replace res_exposure=   6.6     if year==2016    & cntryid==4
replace res_exposure=   16.9    if year==2017    & cntryid==4
replace res_exposure=   17.9    if year==2018    & cntryid==4

//Germany
replace res_exposure=   29.3    if year==2008    & cntryid==5
replace res_exposure=   33.6    if year==2009    & cntryid==5
replace res_exposure=   15.6    if year==2010    & cntryid==5
replace res_exposure=   28.8    if year==2011    & cntryid==5
replace res_exposure=   20.9    if year==2012    & cntryid==5
replace res_exposure=   26.3    if year==2013    & cntryid==5
replace res_exposure=   17.8    if year==2014    & cntryid==5
replace res_exposure=   19.4    if year==2015    & cntryid==5
replace res_exposure=   5.6     if year==2016    & cntryid==5
replace res_exposure=   2.1     if year==2017    & cntryid==5
replace res_exposure=   1.8     if year==2018    & cntryid==5

//Greece
replace res_exposure=   5.9     if year==2008    & cntryid==6
replace res_exposure=   4.3     if year==2009    & cntryid==6
replace res_exposure=   1.6     if year==2010    & cntryid==6
replace res_exposure=   3.3     if year==2011    & cntryid==6
replace res_exposure=   26.2    if year==2012    & cntryid==6
replace res_exposure=   18.6    if year==2013    & cntryid==6
replace res_exposure=   8.0     if year==2014    & cntryid==6
replace res_exposure=   6.2     if year==2015    & cntryid==6
replace res_exposure=   3.9     if year==2016    & cntryid==6
replace res_exposure=   3.9     if year==2017    & cntryid==6
replace res_exposure=   3.9     if year==2018    & cntryid==6

//Italy
replace res_exposure=   2.0     if year==2008    & cntryid==11
replace res_exposure=   5.3     if year==2009    & cntryid==11
replace res_exposure=   4.1     if year==2010    & cntryid==11
replace res_exposure=   7.2     if year==2011    & cntryid==11
replace res_exposure=   9.3     if year==2012    & cntryid==11
replace res_exposure=   17.2    if year==2013    & cntryid==11
```

```
replace res_exposure=   7.3     if year==2014    & cntryid==11
replace res_exposure=   9.5     if year==2015    & cntryid==11
replace res_exposure=   9.2     if year==2016    & cntryid==11
replace res_exposure=   13.8    if year==2017    & cntryid==11
replace res_exposure=   27.0    if year==2018    & cntryid==11

//Poland
replace res_exposure=   1.7     if year==2008    & cntryid==7
replace res_exposure=   0.9     if year==2009    & cntryid==7
replace res_exposure=   0.5     if year==2010    & cntryid==7
replace res_exposure=   0.8     if year==2011    & cntryid==7
replace res_exposure=   1.5     if year==2012    & cntryid==7
replace res_exposure=   14.6    if year==2013    & cntryid==7
replace res_exposure=   28.8    if year==2014    & cntryid==7
replace res_exposure=   15.3    if year==2015    & cntryid==7
replace res_exposure=   5.7     if year==2016    & cntryid==7
replace res_exposure=   2.4     if year==2017    & cntryid==7
replace res_exposure=   4.9     if year==2018    & cntryid==7

//Slovakia
replace res_exposure=   2.7     if year==2008    & cntryid==8
replace res_exposure=   0.7     if year==2009    & cntryid==8
replace res_exposure=   12.5    if year==2010    & cntryid==8
replace res_exposure=   3.1     if year==2011    & cntryid==8
replace res_exposure=   10.7    if year==2012    & cntryid==8
replace res_exposure=   8.0     if year==2013    & cntryid==8
replace res_exposure=   5.5     if year==2014    & cntryid==8
replace res_exposure=   8.2     if year==2015    & cntryid==8
replace res_exposure=   26.6    if year==2016    & cntryid==8
replace res_exposure=   47.8    if year==2017    & cntryid==8
replace res_exposure=   29.2    if year==2018    & cntryid==8

//Sweden
replace res_exposure=   6.5     if year==2008    & cntryid==9
replace res_exposure=   8.2     if year==2009    & cntryid==9
replace res_exposure=   5.1     if year==2010    & cntryid==9
replace res_exposure=   4.1     if year==2011    & cntryid==9
replace res_exposure=   5.7     if year==2012    & cntryid==9
replace res_exposure=   16.2    if year==2013    & cntryid==9
replace res_exposure=   14.6    if year==2014    & cntryid==9
replace res_exposure=   9.0     if year==2015    & cntryid==9
replace res_exposure=   7.2     if year==2016    & cntryid==9
replace res_exposure=   30.3    if year==2017    & cntryid==9
replace res_exposure=   21.1    if year==2018    & cntryid==9

//UnitedKingdom
replace res_exposure=   0.0     if year==2008    & cntryid==10
replace res_exposure=   19.0    if year==2009    & cntryid==10
replace res_exposure=   32.3    if year==2010    & cntryid==10
replace res_exposure=   24.4    if year==2011    & cntryid==10
replace res_exposure=   11.9    if year==2012    & cntryid==10
replace res_exposure=   19.7    if year==2013    & cntryid==10
replace res_exposure=   4.8     if year==2014    & cntryid==10
replace res_exposure=   25.4    if year==2015    & cntryid==10
replace res_exposure=   22.9    if year==2016    & cntryid==10
```

```
replace res_exposure=     17.1      if year==2017     & cntryid==10
replace res_exposure=     9.3       if year==2018     & cntryid==10

logit mediahit1 MP orgage C_yyyy electionyear voterrpp miginflow migmip refugees mobfreq6
i.actortype immigration europe lawandorder civilrights economy scope i.repertoire3 i.ctrmob i.NSWE
res_exposure

logit mediahit1 MP orgage C_yyyy electionyear voterrpp miginflow migmip refugees mobfreq6
i.actortype immigration europe lawandorder civilrights economy scope i.repertoire3 i.ctrmob i.NSWE


///UNPACKING VERBAL/PHYISICAL COUNTERMOBILISATION///
gen verbal=0
 replace verbal=1 if ctrmob1==1

logit mediahit1 actortype MP immigration europe economy lawandorder civilrights size i.repertoire3
i.ctrmob verbal orgage C_yyyy electionyear voterrpp miginflow refugees migmip mobfreq6 i.mediasyst,
or

///use POLDEM dataset from www.poldem.eu
// Share of far-right protests///
gen farright=0
replace farright=1 if issue_xeno==1 | issue_cult_cons==1 | actor_party_right==1

gen left=.
replace left=1 if farright==0
gen pr=1

preserve
collapse (sum) farright pr, by(year)
gen rw=.
replace rw=farright/pr*100
twoway line rw year
graph rename aggregate, replace
restore

preserve
keep if farright==1
bysort year: egen meanpart=mean(part_all)
tab meanpart year
restore
```

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